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ABSTRACT 
The aim of the Commerce Act 1986 is to promote competition, and thereby consumer 
welfare and efficiency. To achieve these goals, New Zealand has adopted a "light-
handed" approach to competition law, which suggests that anticompetitive outcomes, 
rather than the processes or structures which produce those outcomes, should be its focus. 
The interpretation given to the key provisions of New Zealand's competition law have, 
however, proved to be inconsistent with this standard, when applied to oligopolies. 
While there is evidence that some oligopolistic industries are not competitive, 
anticompetitive conduct in such markets would appear to fall outside of the prohibitions 
of sections 27 and 36 of the Commerce Act. The courts have applied a process-based test to 
the issue of collusion, with the result that the tacit collusion of oligopolists may not be 
subject to liability under s 27, although the results of such behaviour are 
indistinguishable from those produced by explicit agreements. 
Similarly, the prohibition on the use of dominance ins 36 has been held to apply only to 
the conduct of single firms, despite the ability of oligopolists to effectively achieve 
"joint dominance" and use it to produce anticompetitive outcomes. 
The more realistic approach taken to these issues in the European Community, and to a 
lesser extent the United States, appears better suited to the stated goals of competition 
law, and does not conflict with the light-handed philosophy currently favoured in New 
Zealand. 
Word Length 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography 
and annexures) comprises approximately 15,570 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
The enforcement of effective competition in oligopolistic markets has 
been described as "a persistent and difficult problem of antitrust policy".1 
In industries consisting of a small number of sellers, there exists the 
potential for significant deviations from competitive price and output 
levels, and consequently for resources to be channelled in inefficient 
directions and for technological innovation to be inhibited. 
The difficulty in combating such outcomes lies in the fact that 
competition laws are typically framed, or have been interpreted, in terms 
which seem to assume a competitive market structure, where explicit 
collusion or near-monopolisation by a single firm would be necessary to 
produce anticompetitive results. Such conduct may not be required to 
produce the same results in an oligopoly. A concentrated market 
structure allows firms to form tacit agreements without the need for the 
explicit communication generally required under anti-collusion 
provisions, or to jointly dominant a market, through recognition of the 
fact that their economic fortunes are influenced by the behaviour of 
their rivals. Oligopolists may "learn", purely from observation over 
time, that profits can be enhanced for all producers, at the expense of 
consumers and potential market entrants, if output and pricing 
decisions are coordinated. 
Section 27 of the Commerce Act 1986, and similar provisions m other 
jurisdictions which prohibit anticompetitive "arrangements or 
understandings", have generally been held to require some form of 
communicated agreement between the parties; while the prohibition on 
the use of market dominance in s 36 has been limited to situations 
where a single firm holds a high degree of market control. 
This paper considers the economic background to the "oligopoly 
problem", including a comparison of the goals of New Zealand's 
competition policy with the observed behaviour of participants in the 
oligopolistic retail petrol market. The market dominance and anti-
1 Posner, "Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach" (1969) 21 Stanford 
Law Rev 1562; Goldman, "Oligopoly Policy and the Ethyl Corp. case" (1986) 65 Oregon 
Law Rev 73, 74. 
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collusion prov1s10ns m a number of jurisdictions are then discussed, 
including those of the United States and the European Community, 
where the approach to oligopoly regulation appears more consistent 
with these goals. 
II ECONOMIC MODELS OF COMPETITION 
A Perfect Competition and Monopoly2 
The basic economic model of a market is one of "perfect competition". In 
such a market all participants are assumed to act rationally - consumers 
will make decisions in pursuit of their own self-interest and producers 
will aim to maximise their profits - and the market itself is characterised 
by extremely high levels of competition. The market is made up of large 
numbers of buyers and sellers, with each being a "price taker", in the 
sense that no individual participant can reasonably hope to single-
handedly alter the market price from the equilibrium set by the law of 
supply and demand. There are also assumed to be no barriers to entry. 
Any producer can sell its entire output at the equilibrium price, but even 
a small increase in price by any seller will result in the loss of all of its 
sales, as all consumers are assumed to have free access to all market 
information, and they may freely change from one supplier to any other 
in order to get the best possible deal for themselves. At any price level 
~ 
significantly above or below this equilibrium, excess demand or supply 
will provide an incentive to change, and the market will eventually 
work its way back to the equilibrium point. Uniform pricing, at an 
approximately equilibrium level, is therefore a sign of a competitive 
industry. 
2See Areeda and Turner, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their 
Application, Boston, Little Brown & Co. (1978), p268-272; Baumol and Blinder, 
Economics: Principles and Policy (5th ed.), Orlando, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc. 
(1991), eh 25 and 27; Corones, Restrictive Trade Practices Law, North Ryde, The Law 
Book Co. Ltd (1994), p3-6; and Stiglitz, Economics, New York, W.W. Norton & Co. Inc. 
(1993), p30-31 and 396. 
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Supply and Demand Conditions facing a Firm in a 
Perfectly Competitive Market 
Above is a simple illustration of supply and demand m a perfectly 
competitive market.3 Basically, producers will be willing to supply more 
at higher prices, and consumers will demand less. The point where the 
supply and demand curves meet, in this case at a price of about $1 and 
quantity of about 35,000 units, represents the equilibrium market price4 
and quantity. Under perfect competition the profit rate for all suppliers is 
equal; no firm is able to make "excess profits".5 Achieving as perfectly 
competitive a market as possible is thus assumed to be the best way to 
maintain economic efficiency, as such a market will produce the goods 
that consumers want at the least possible cost, and the allocation of 
resources among producers will be dictated solely by consumers' "money 
votes". 
At the other end of the theoretical scale is the "monopoly", a model of a 
market characterised by a total lack of competition. In a monopolistic 
3Adapted from Stiglitz, above n2, p87-93. 
4Cost would also be $1 per unit in this case. Cost per unit, including a "normal" return on 
investment, is assumed to be the same as the competitive market price. Under perfectly 
competitive conditions, the point at which the supply and demand curves meet is also 
where marginal cost and marginal revenue (ie. the cost and revenue resulting from the 
last item produced) are equal. 
50therwise known as "monopoly profits", ie. returns in excess of what could be earned 
under competitive conditions, which result from reductions in output and increases in price 
from competitive levels, rather than from greater efficiency, superior knowledge and 
managerial ability: See Stiglitz, above n2, p402-404. 
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market, one supplier supplies the whole market and there are 
substantial barriers to entry. The supplier may therefore to some extent 
dictate the price it charges for its product. This will lower demand and 
result in less than optimal amounts of resources being channelled into 
production, with more money simply being transferred from consumers 
to the supplier without any corresponding increase in production. 
Referring to the diagram above; if, for example, a monopoly supplier 
had the ability to increase the price of its product to $1.50, and restrict the 
supply to about 18,000 units, the consequences could be inefficient in 
both an allocative and productive sense. Allocative inefficiency may 
arise as some consumption is excluded through the increase in price and 
restriction of supply and, although there may be other firms willing to 
make up this gap in supply, they are excluded from doing so due to the 
barriers to entry which exist in the monopolistic market. Productive or 
operating efficiency may be lost due to the fact that monopolies are not 
under the same compulsion to minimise costs as firms facing 
competition. Areeda and Turner note that "it is widely suspected ... that 
monopoly tends to beget waste and a less than zealous effort to adapt to 
cost-saving innovations".6 While the monopolist will make an excess 
profit in this situation? the loss suffered by consumers will be greater. 
This loss to consumers not offset by any gain to the seller,8 is known as a 
"dead weight loss". 
A further source of concern arising from monopolies is "rent seeking". 
Monopolies may devote their resources to obtaining or maintaining 
6Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their Application, Boston, Little 
Brown & Co. (1978), p272. See Eaton & Eswaran, Supporting Collusion by Choice of 
Inferior Technologies (1991) University of Tasmania Department of Economics Discussion 
Paper 1991-06 for an analysis of this phenomenon as it applies to oligopolies. 
7In this case about $9,000 (revenue of $1.50 x 18,000 units ($27,000), less costs of $1 per unit 
($18,000)). 
8Economists do not regard mere redistributions of wealth, eg. from consumers to suppliers, 
as social costs. Efficiency, in the sense of making the "economic pie" as large as possible, 
is seen as the sole objective of competition policy, with questions of social equity left to 
other mechanisms such as the welfare system: Brock, The Antitrust Debate in N ew 
Zealand: Commentary, Paper prepared for the New Zealand Business Roundtable (1989), 
pl-3. The societal loss caused by monopoly inefficiency is difficult to determine. Freeman 
and Medoff, What Do Unions Do?, New York, Basic Books (1984), p57, estimate the cost 
of the economic inefficiency caused, for example, by trade unions' monopolisation of the 
labour supply in the United States to be around $5-10 billion per annum. Lande and Zerbe, 
"Anticonsumer Effects of Union Mergers: An Antitrust Solution" (1996) 46 Duke LJ 197, 217, 
estimate it to be about one third of this and, for this and other reasons, recommend that 
the existing exemption of trade unions from the United States antitrust laws be removed. 
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their monopoly position, or deterring the entry of competitors, for 
example by lobbying for government protection.9 This is not only an 
unproductive use of resources, but may impose further costs on third 
parties such as competitors or potential competitors who seek to oppose 
it. 
B OligopolyIO 
The perfect competition and monopoly models are both based upon 
extreme assumptions that are very rarely, if ever, found in real 
markets.11 For this reason, alternative models have been produced that 
some feel better represent firms existing in the marketplace. These 
models of "imperfect competition" share some attributes of perfect 
competition and some attributes of monopoly. One of these models is 
the "oligopoly", which is characterised by the existence of a few large 
firms producing a similar though differentiated product. Oligopolies 
develop when there are "barriers to entry" of various types keeping 
potential rivals out of the market. No single firm is able to eliminate all 
close substitutes for its product, however. Therefore, mutual 
interdependence among all firms in the market exists,12 as well as heavy 
non-price competition. 
With respect to the barriers to entry which are present in oligopolies, 
Fellner notes that "economies of scale as well as 'artificial' methods of 
excluding competitors" are the primary sources of "fewness" in such 
markets. 13 He goes on to describe three sets of circumstances where 
oligopolistic conditions are likely to exist, namely where a firm's large 
size results in lower production costs; where smaller entrants can be 
excluded by the acquisition of exclusive rights to resources, patents or 
licenses, or contracts with persons possessing specific skills; and where 
an outside organising agency (such as the Government, or a trade or 
9Posner, "The Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation" (1975) 83 J Pol Econ 807, 812; 
Stiglitz, above n2, p451-452; Hovenkarnp, "Antitrust Policy and the Social Cost of 
Monopoly" (1993) 78 Iowa Law Rev 371, 373-374; and Corones, above n2, p6. 
10see Areeda and Turner, above n2, p272-281; Baumol and Blinder, above n2, p596-608; 
and Stiglitz, above n2, p397 and 423-445. 
11See United States v E./. Ou Pont de Nemours & Co. (1953) 118 FSupp 41, 49-50. 
12Stiglitz defines an oligopoly as a market with "sufficiently few firms that each 
worries about how rivals will respond to any action it undertakes": above n2, p397. 
13Competition Among the Few, New York, Augustus M. Kelley (1960), pxi. 
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professional association) restricts entry into the market.14 So-called 
"vertical integration", where a firm controls the production of 
intermediate products as well as final consumer goods,15 or where 
derivative markets exist which are dependent on the market for the 
firm's base product,16 may also strengthen an oligopolistic structure by 
effectively "tying" one stage of production to another, and so extending 
the oligopoly to all levels of an industry. 
The courts have also noted the importance of barriers to entry in 
oligopolistic markets. While New Zealand and Australia have produced 
little case law to date involving oligopolies as such,17 there have been a 
number of Australian cases where at least passing reference has been 
made to their characteristics. In these cases, the potential for the misuse 
of "market power" in oligopolies, and the link between such power and 
barriers to entry were particularly noted.18 
For example, in Trade Practices Commission v Ansett Transport 
Industries (Operations) Pty. Ltd,19 which centred on the definition of 
market "dominance" under s 50 of the Trade Practices Act 1974, 
Northrop J briefly discussed the features of oligopolies, basing his 
comments on two text-book references: 
"The word 'oligopoly' is used frequently in the literature of economics and appears 
to be used to describe a type of market where a small number of firms account for a 
large proportion of the output of that market ... Professor Areeda describes the 
oligopoly or shared monopoly market as a market 'where no single firm possesses 
sufficient power to be considered a monopoly but where the behaviour and economic 
14At p44-48. 
l5Stiglitz, above n2, p582-583 cites the example of the Ford Motor Company, which at 
one time owned its own steel mill to provide the steel used in making its cars. In 
Queensland Wire Industries Pty. Ltd v Broken Hill Pty. Co. Ltd (1989) 167 CLR 177, BHP 
controlled the production of "Y-bar", a steel product used in the manufacture of steel fence 
posts, and hence also controlled the market for those posts. 
16For example, the market for car parts and service is derived from the market for car 
sales. Motor vehicle manufacturers may offer "free" parts and service for new cars for a 
period, the cost of which will in fact have been incorporated into the sale price of the 
car. 
17Re Magnum Corp. Ltd and Dominion Breweries Ltd (1986) 2 TCLR 177 and Re Trade 
Practices Commission and Email Ltd (1980) 3 ATPR 42,367 appear to be the only reported 
cases where oligopolistic behaviour has been directly considered. 
18See also the comments of Leahy DJ in United States v E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. 
(1953) 118 FSupp 41, 49, cited at n137. 
19(1978) 32 FLR 305. 
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performance of several firms approaches that of a single-firm monopolist'."20 
In Queensland Wire Industries Pty. Ltd v Broken Hill Pty. Co. Ltd,21 a 
case dealing with the alleged misuse of market power under s 46 of the 
Trade Practices Act, Mason CJ and Wilson J noted that barriers to entry 
were a significant factor in assessing the degree of such power a firm 
enjoys: 
"Significant barriers to entry are the sine qua non [ie. the essential requirement] of 
monopoly and oligopoly, for ... sellers have little or no enduring power over price 
when entry barriers are non-existent."22 
No universal model of oligopolistic behaviour exists. The various 
models used to predict such behaviour differ mainly in their respective 
assessments of why and how "mutual interdependence" among firms 
occurs. They include the following: 
The "kinked demand" model23 is based on the observation that prices in 
oligopolistic markets tend to change less frequently than those in 
competitive markets. For example, Baumol and Blinder note that the 
prices of agricultural commodities like corn, soybeans and cocoa, which 
are sold in markets with large numbers of sellers, can change minute by 
minute; while the prices of television sets and cars, which are supplied 
by oligopolists, may resist change for months or years at a time.24 
20 At 322-323, citing Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 
Chicago, Rand McNally (1970), p165 (now in its third edition: Boston, Houghton Mifflin 
(1990)); and Areeda, Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, Cases (2nd ed.), Boston, Little 
Brown & Co. (1974), p224 (now in its fourth edition: Boston, Little Brown & Co. (1988)). 
21(1989) 167 CLR 177. 
22At 189; citing Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (2nd ed.), 
Chicago, Rand McNally (1980), pll. This passage was also cited in Re Arnotts Ltd (1990) 
24 FCR 313 and Trade Practices Commission v Pioneer Concrete (Qld) Pty. Ltd (1994) 16 
ATPR 42,211. 
23First suggested by Hayes, Our Economic System, New York, Holt (1928), p321 and 
developed by Sweezy, "Demand Under Conditions of Oligopoly" (1939) 47 J Pol Econ 568. 
The model seems to be generally accepted by economists, although it has been criticised 
by those of the Chicago school, who appear to dislike its somewhat heuristic and ad hoe 
nature: See Stigler, "The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve and Rigid Prices" (1947) 55 J 
Pol Econ 432 and Freedman, "The Economist as Mythmaker - Stigler's Kinky 
Transformation" (1995) 29 J Econ Issues 175. 
24Economics: Principles and Policy (5th ed.), Orlando, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc. 
(1991), p603-606. See also Ross, "Oligopoly Theory and Price Rigidity" (1987) 32 
Antitrust Bulletin 451. 
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The reason for this price rigidity lies in the fact that an oligopolist must 
take note of the likely reactions of its competitors when deciding 
whether or not to raise or drop its prices. It may be that firms will follow 
the price increases of rivals but ignore their price decreases, resulting in 
prices "sticking" at high levels. In such cases, a firm will feel relatively 
safe from losing its customers to competitors if it raises its prices. 
Alternatively, if price decreases are followed and increases ignored, 
firms will be unlikely to raise their prices much above the initial market 
equilibrium, for fear of having their sales taken by the other firms in the 
market. 
To illustrate this, the kinked demand model makes use of two different 
demand curves, both passing through the initial point of market 
equilibrium, where the quantity which the producer is willing to supply 
equals the quantity demanded by consumers (indicated by X in the 
diagram below). 
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The "Kinked Demand" Model: Demand Conditions faced 
by a Firm in an Oligopolistic Market 
In this example, demand curve CXD indicates the expected changes in 
demand if competitors do not respond to a given oligopolistic firm 's 
price changes; while curve AXB represents what happens if competitors 
do match such changes. The demand curve which the firm actually faces 
is a combination of the two: curve AXD. This diagram represents a "lose 
/ lose" situation for our hypothetical oligopolist, ie. one where the firm 
10 
has good reason to fear that only its price decreases, and not its increases, 
will be followed. Thus, if it raises its price above X, it will lose customers 
and this loss will not be made up by the increased revenue per item sold. 
Many of the firm's customers will choose to purchase the product from 
the other firms in the market, who continue to charge lower prices. 
Demand is thus "elastic"25 above the equilibrium level. On the other 
hand, if it lowers its price, the resulting increase in demand will be 
comparatively small, as the other firms can be expected to follow the 
price decrease shortly after. Demand is therefore relatively "inelastic" for 
prices below X.26 These are the conditions an oligopolist could expect to 
face in the absence of any collusion27 between market participants. Fear 
of being undercut by a competitor will prevent any firm unilaterally 
raising its prices above the equilibrium point. 
Alternatively, however, a firm might be in a situation where it has 
reason to feel confident that its price increases will be followed and its 
decreases ignored, in which case the demand curve for that firm will be 
something like curve CXB .28 In such cases, the drop in expected sales 
will not be sufficient to counteract the rise in revenue which will result 
from a price hike. Prices will therefore tend to rise when demand or 
costs increase, but not necessarily drop if these factors decrease. In 
economic terms, if higher than the expected market equilibrium price is 
charged by all participants in an oligopolistic market, collusion29 of some 
sort is an obvious inference. 
The kinked demand model of oligopolistic conduct illustrates what 
could be expected to happen in cases where firms do, or do not, expect 
25"Elastic" demand occurs when consumers respond sharply to any price change. 
"Inelastic" demand refers to situations where consumer response to such changes is 
relatively insignificant. 
26The demand curve in this situation - AXD - is described by Reid, The Kinked Demand 
Curve Analysis of Oligopoly, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press (1981), p16, as 
having an "obtuse" or "normal" kink. 
27See below for the distinction between the economic and legal approaches to the issue of 
"collusion". 
28Having a "reverse" or reflex" kink: Reid, Th e Kinked Demand Curve Analysis of 
Oligopoly, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press (1981), pl6. In such a case, the 
inelastic curve AXB would indicate the expected change in demand if competitors did not 
respond to a price change; and the more elastic curve CXD would apply if competitors did 
match the change. 
29That is, collusion in the economic sense, which includes "conscious parallelism" as well 
as formal agreement. Oligopolists may learn that parallel conduct will maximise profits 
above the competitive level, without the need for communication between the parties. 
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their rivals to follow their price changes. The "collusion" and "price 
leadership" models go a step further, in attempting to model the 
processes by which such expectations may be raised. 
The "collusion" model is based on the assumption that firms collude 
and cooperate in making output and price decisions, in order to increase 
industry profits by raising prices and / or restricting supply. 
Formal collusion,30 in the form of cartels or open agreements, is 
prohibited by the competition laws of many countries,31 as is so-called 
"tacit" collusion,32 if it amounts to an unlawful conspiracy. In economic 
terms, however, "collusion" does not necessarily denote a "meeting of 
minds" in the legal sense.33 While the law emphasises the distinction 
between allegedly anti-competitive action taken in concert and that 
taken independently, economic oligopoly theory focuses solely on the 
outcomes of such action. It is assumed that the actions of competitors 
must rationally be taken into account, and so no distinction is made 
between expressed and tacit agreement - both are maintained because it 
is in the individual firm's self-interest to do so.34 
As demonstrated above, the incentives for oligopolists to raise or cut 
their prices depend largely on the likely responses to such actions of the 
other firms in the industry. Economists make use of mathematical 
"game theory" models to analyse the potential for collusion in such 
circumstances. In these models, each firm is seen as a "player" in a game 
30 As long ago as 1776 Adam Smith, "the founder of modern economics", observed that 
"people of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but 
the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise 
prices": An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776), 
reprinted: Oxford, Clarendon Press (1979), Book I, chapter x, part b; cited by Stiglitz, 
above n2, p424. 
31At least those which have developed a "comprehensive competition law", such as the 
United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia: Norman, "Policy Under Pressure: 
The Evolution of Antitrust Policy in Australia", in Round (ed.), The Australian Trade 
Practices Act 1974: Proscriptions and Prescriptions for n More Competitive Economy, 
Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers (1994), p526. 
32That is, parallel conduct resulting from agreements which are implied or inferred, 
rather than directly expressed. 
33cases like Re British Basic Slag Ltd [1963] 2 All ER 807, 814 and 819; Monsanto Co. v 
Spray Rite Service Corp. (1984) 465 US 752, 764 and Auckland Regional Authority v 
Mutunl Rental Cars (Auckland Airport) Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 2647, 661-662 all refer to the 
need for communication between the colluding parties, and a "conscious commitment to a 
common scheme" before liability can arise under anti-collusion provisions. 
34Yao and De Santi, "Game Theory and the Legal Analysis of Tacit Collusion" (1993) 38 
Antitrust Bulletin 113, 125-126. 
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of strategy. The outcomes, or "payoffs" for each participant will depend 
not only on the choices made by the firm itself, but also on those made 
by its competitors.35 Yao and De Santi describe the premises of non-
cooperative game theory36 as follows: 
"Non-cooperative game theory is based on the premise that fully rational 
oligopolistic behaviour requires a consideration of the interdependence of 
strategies, and that such a consideration leads managers to a self-reinforcing set of 
strategies in which each strategy is a best response to the other [participants'] 
strategies ... Non-cooperative game theory includes 'repeated games', ie. strategic 
interactions that take into account the history of the play ... Although this 
approach assumes a considerable amount of rationality on the part of competitors, 
it does appear to correspond in spirit to anecdotal evidence of business decision 
making and has some support from the experimental literature."37 
Game theory uses a "payoff matrix" to indicate the possible choices and 
outcomes available to each participant; for example, the profits each 
participant can expect to earn depending on the pricing strategy each 
adopts. In the table below,38 two companies (A Ltd and B Ltd) can either 
choose a high or low pricing strategy. If both charge high prices, they will 
each earn a substantial profit of $10 million; while if both offer low 
prices, each will make a comparatively modest $3 million. If only one 
firm charges the low price while the other does not, it will make a profit 
of $12 million (by increasing its market share at the expense of its 
competitor) and the other firm will make a $2 million loss. 
35stiglitz, above n2, p426-428; and Baumol and Blinder, above n2, p601-604. 
36Non-cooperative game theory assumes that each participant is free to choose any 
available strategy, subject only to its own self-interest and its assessment of what its 
competitors will do. Cooperative game theory, on the other hand, allows participants to 
make binding agreements which limit their possible responses. 
37 above n34, 122-123. 
38 Adapted from Baumol and Blinder, above n2, p602. 
B Ltd 
High Price 
B Ltd 
Low Price 
A Ltd 
High Price 
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A makes $10m 
B makes $10m 
A loses $2m 
B makes $12m 
A Ltd 
Low Price 
A makes $12m 
B loses $2m 
A makes $3m 
B makes $3m 
In a non-repeating game situation like this,39 the possibility that a 
competitor will drop its price virtually forces each firm to charge the low 
price and forego the higher profit it could earn if it had reason to expect 
the other to follow any price increase. Game theory suggests that each 
firm should rationally choose from among the alternative strategies 
based on the minimum payoff each strategy offers. The safest option, 
assuming each firm makes a single, independent, decision, is the one 
with the highest minimum payoff - the "maximin strategy".40 In this 
case the best option for both participants is to charge the lower price and 
earn a profit of $3 million. 
In practice, of course, oligopolists do not simply make one pricing 
decision and stick to it. They interact over time, responding to and 
learning from their rivals' behaviour. Experimental economics, where 
the actual behaviour of participants in repeated strategic games is 
observed, suggests that oligopolists will develop strategies which, 
although apparently irrational in the short term, will result in tacit 
collusion over time. Professor Robert Axelrod, a mathematician and 
political scientist, conducted one such experiment in the late 1970s. He 
invited experts in game theory to submit programs for a computer game 
theory tournament. Each program had available to it an assumed history 
39That is, one where each participant makes only one decision, and there is only one set 
of outcomes. 
40Baumol and Blinder, above n2, p602. 
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of interaction between itself and a rival, which it could use in choosing 
from the available options for a set number of moves into the future. 
Many very elaborate programs were submitted, but the best outcomes 
were consistently produced by one employing a simple "tit for tat" 
strategy, whereby the players start with a cooperative first move, and 
then simply do whatever the other player did on their previous move.41 
Stiglitz describes the strategy as follows: 
"If you increase your output, I will do the same, even if it does not maximise my 
profits. If the rival firm believes this threat, especially after it has been carried 
out a few times, the rival may decide that it is more profitable to cooperate and 
keep production low [and prices high] rather than to cheat. In the real world, such 
simple strategies may play an important role in ensuring that, in those markets 
where there are only three or four dominant firms, the firms do not compete too 
vigorous! y. "42 
Axelrod himself also notes the applicability of "tit for tat" to oligopolistic 
corn petition. 43 
With this sort of tacit collusion in oligopolistic pricing decisions, firms 
can feel relatively safe in charging higher prices and consequently 
earning higher profits, although the slightly higher return which may be 
gained from unilaterally lowering prices leaves open the possibility of 
one or more firms "cheating" on any tacit agreement. Axelrod's 
experiments suggest, however, that this sort of cheating is unlikely, at 
least in the long term, as a cut to an agreed price by an oligopolistic firm 
will generally be followed shortly afterwards by its competitors, leading 
to a drop in profits for both. Firms will therefore learn that it is more 
profitable to cooperate and keep prices high than it is to cheat. 
The "price leadership" model is based on the assumption that firms copy 
the behaviour of a "leading" firm, even though there is no explicit 
agreement to do so. That firm is effectively assigned (or takes on) the 
task of making pricing decisions for the whole group. Such an 
arrangement allows the members of an oligopoly to coordinate their 
pricing and output behaviour to achieve the greatest collective good, 
41 Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, London, Penguin Books Ltd (1984), p30-31. 
42 Above n2, p428. 
43 Above n41, p28. 
15 
without having to openly "cut a deal". 
The price leader may be the firm that dominates the market, the lowest 
cost firm, or a "barometric" firm. Economists tend to describe price 
leadership as a form of tacit collusion,44 although the courts have held 
that the existence of parallel prices in an oligopolistic market does not 
justify an inference that actionable collusion has taken place.45 Again, 
the legal emphasis on the method, rather then the results, of potentially 
anticompetitive conduct leaves the way open for firms to claim that they 
are simply reacting to the same market forces as the price leader. 
It is, of course, possible that the perfectly competitive market may be 
approximated in an oligopoly; that is, the parallel behaviour evident in 
such markets may be the result of something approaching normal 
competitive forces.46 In this regard, economists refer to "Cournot" and 
"Bertrand" competition.47 
"Cournot" competition refers to the situation where an oligopolist 
believes that its competitors are committed to producing a given 
quantity, and will reduce their prices, if necessary, until they can sell the 
production level to which they are committed. The demand curve faced 
by the individual firm in such a situation equals the market demand 
curve, shifted downwards at each price level by the quantity which its 
competitors are committed to producing. The firm will then choose to 
produce at the point where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, that 
is, where the extra revenue earned by selling one further unit is the 
same as the cost of producing that extra unit of output. Fellner describes 
the competitive process under Cournot competition as follows: 
"If each [oligopolist] continues to assume that the other will not change his rate of 
output, then ultimately they will prove to be correct, although during the 
approach to the equilibrium ... they will be wrong. A produces a quantity which 
maximises his profits on the assumption that B will go on producing his present 
44Baumol and Blinder, above n2, p599; Stiglitz, above n2, p428-429. 
45 Re Trade Practices Commission and Email Ltd (1980) 3 ATPR 42,367. 
46See the decision of the Commerce Commission in Re Magnum Corp. Ltd and Dominion 
Breweries Ltd (1986) 2 TCLR 177, 196. 
47Named for Augustin Cournot and Joseph Bertrand, the French economists and 
mathematicians who first s tudied these patterns of behaviour among oligopolists in 1838 
and 1883 respectively. 
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output, whereupon B adjusts his output so as to maximise his profits on the 
assumption that A will go on producing his present output, which induces A to 
adjust his output, etc."48 
These adjustments ultimately result in a stable output from each firm, 
in accordance with their initial assumptions. The resulting equilibrium 
output (and therefore market efficiency) will be lower under conditions 
of Cournot competition than in a perfectly competitive market, but 
greater than in a monopoly. A monopoly must bear all of the reduction 
in marginal revenue, which necessarily comes about with increased 
production, by itself; while under the Cournot assumption, this loss of 
revenue is spread among the various rival firms in the oligopoly.49 
It has been noted that, although the Cournot competitive model may be 
treated as the "parent model" for oligopoly analysis, a realistic approach 
to most industries cannot be based on Cournot's theory, since the 
assumption that firms will follow a policy of fixed output is generally 
quite unreasonable in practice: 
"To be sure, that firms should assume of one another ... a policy of fixed output is 
conceivable, but on the way to the Cournot equilibrium they would necessarily 
realise that their assumptions were incorrect, and then would change their 
assumptions. "50 
The only markets where this type of competition could realistically be 
expected to occur are those where a major part of the cost of production 
lies in the cost of machinery and other capital goods and where, once 
these are in place, variable costs are relatively unimportant. In industries 
such as steel or aluminium production, output may be determined 
largely by the market's production capacity, but it is difficult to see this 
assumption holding true in many other cases. 
"Bertrand" competition recognises the fact that, in many oligopolistic 
industries, it is an easy matter to expand production to meet demand. 
Stiglitz uses the examples of a taxi company in a large city, which can 
easily buy a new car and hire more drivers; and a domestic airline, 
48Fellner, above n13, p57-58. 
49Stiglitz, above n2, p436-440. 
50Fellner, above n13, p65. 
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which can increase the number of flights on a particular route relatively 
quickly if need be.51 Bertrand's theory was that a firm in such a market 
will price its product in order to maximise its profits, on the assumption 
that its competitors' prices are fixed, and that they will adjust their 
output to meet whatever demand arises at that price. The demand curve 
facing an individual firm in such an industry will be more elastic than 
the market demand curve (ie. the curve indicating the total demand, 
assuming that all participants charge the same price). This is because 
each firm will lose large numbers of customers if it raises its prices even 
slightly, but the majority of those customers will simply move to its 
rivals, and so will not be lost to the market as a whole (see diagram 
below).52 The competitive process, and the resulting equilibrium price 
and quantity, are therefore much like those in a perfectly competitive 
market. The process has been described as follows: 
"Since each company believes its rival will not budge its prices so long as price 
exceeds marginal costs, each one will find that it pays it to shave its prices by a 
small amount. By doing so, it steals the whole [or a substantial part of the] 
market.53 But the rival firm, thinking the same way, then undercuts still further. 
The process continues until the price is bid down to a point where there are zero 
[excess] profits [that is, to the point where marginal cost equals marginal revenue]. 
It does not pay to cut prices any further."54 
51Stiglitz, above n2, p438. 
52Adapted from Stiglitz, above n2, p438. 
53Depending on how closely substitutable the firms' products are. In general, the products 
produced by oligopolists are close, but not perfect, substitutes; demand will be elastic, but 
not completely so. 
54Stiglitz, above n2, p440. 
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In theory then, in the absence of express or tacit cooperation between 
market participants, an oligopolistic market structure does not 
necessarily lead to anticompetitive behaviour. If firms do not collude, 
market efficiency and consumer welfare should not suffer to an 
appreciable extent. But is this the case in practice? Are oligopolies in fact 
"anticompetitive" in terms of the Commerce Act 1986? In order to 
answer this, the objectives of this country's competition law, and how 
they compare to the behaviour observed among participants in the 
oligopolistic retail petrol market, are considered below. 
Ill OLIGOPOLIES IN PRACTICE 
A The Objectives of Competition Law 
Taking a purposive approach to the question, any regulation of 
oligopolies must be consistent with the aims of competition law as a 
whole.SS Chief among these aims is the fostering of economic efficiency, 
SSThe Court of Appeal, in Port Nelson Ltd v Commerce Commission [1996] 3 NZLR 554, 
564, endorsed such an approach in interpreting s 27 of the Act. On the question of whether 
all the parties to a "contract, arrangement or understanding" must share the proscribed 
purpose of substantially lessening competition, Gault J said: "The objective of the 
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although it is worth noting the wider constructions sometimes placed 
upon the competition statutes of, for example, Australia, the United 
States and New Zealand, by the courts of those jurisdictions. 
Economists typically refer to competition policy as an area of purely 
"economic", rather than social concern. Brock discusses the objectives of 
competition policy, and the role of competition law in particular, and 
concludes that the goal of competition policy should be the generation of 
what he describes as "socially optimal" outcomes. However, he equates 
"social optimality" and "the public interest" with economic efficiency, 
which is achieved when "net benefit", ie. consumer surplus + producer 
surplus, is maximised. Competition law, he argues, should be aimed at 
making the economic pie as large as possible. "Side issues", such as how 
the pie is to be distributed equitably, should be dealt with by means of tax 
relief and the social welfare system, rather than being achieved through 
competition law: 
"I believe that efficiency should be the sole objective of competition policy ... 
Equity benefits should not be weighted in an efficiency-based approach to 
antitrust. Equity is best dealt with by a direct approach rather than through the 
indirect approach of competition policy."56 
The aims of Australia's competition law, as described by the courts of 
that country, generally represent a somewhat "toned down" version of 
the efficiency argument. In Refrigerated Express Lines (Australia) Pty. Ltd 
v Australian Meat & Livestock Corporation, Deane J explained the aims 
of Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974 as follows: 
"Part IV is headed 'Restrictive Trade Practices'. The general purpose and scope of 
the Part can be described by saying that it contains provisions which proscribe and 
regulate agreements and conduct, and which are aimed at procuring and 
maintaining competition in trade and commerce."57 
The same judge noted, in the Queensland Wire case, that the "essential 
notions" and objectives of Part IV are economic and not moral ones. 
statutory provision must be borne in mind. The promotion of competition should not be 
inhibited by the artificiality of search for unanimous purposes". See also Union Shipping 
NZ Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd [1990) 2 NZLR 662, 700, cited below. 
56 Above n8, p2 (emphasis in original). 
57(1980) 44 FLR 455,460. 
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Referring particularly to s 46, he said: 
"The notions are those of markets, market power, competitors in a market and 
competition. The objective is the protection and advancement of a competitive 
environment and competitive conduct by precluding advantage being taken of 'a 
substantial degree of power in a market' for any of the prescribed purposes."58 
In the opinion of Mason CJ and Wilson J, the object of s 46 (and, by 
extension, Part IV of the Act in general) is to protect the interests of 
consumers by preventing conduct that threatens or undermines 
competition, rather than the economic well-being of individual 
competitors.59 
It has been said by the United States Supreme Court that "regulating 
oligopoly and the [social and economic] evils associated with it is a 
classic exercise of the State's police powers."60 The approach taken in the 
United States identifies the promotion of competition as the overriding 
aim of antitrust law, but the courts have at times taken a narrower view, 
seeing market concentration almost as an evil in itself, quite apart from 
its observed effects. 
Brown Shoe Co. v United States61 is often cited in this regard. In that 
case, Warren CJ referred to the "congressional concern with the 
protection of competition, not competitors", and its desire to restrain 
conduct only to the extent that it may tend to lessen competition.62 This 
was described as "axiomatic" by Kennedy J in Brooke Group Ltd v Brown 
& Williamson Tobacco Corp.63 
Somewhat unusually, however, the logical step from higher levels of 
competition to greater efficiency and enhanced consumer welfare does 
not seem to have been stressed by the American courts. The enactment 
58(1989) 167 CLR 177, 194. 
59At 191. 
60Hawaii Housing Authority v Medcliff (1984) 81 LEd (2d) 186, 198, a decision of the 
United States Supreme Court dealing with the legality of a compulsory land acquisition 
by the State designed to counter a perceived "land oligopoly" traceable to the early high 
chiefs of the islands. 
61(1962) 370 us 294. 
62At 320. 
63(1993) 509 us 209, 224. 
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of statutes with the stated purpose of preventing market concentration64 
seems to have sometimes resulted in that aim being pursued even at the 
expense of market efficiency, and when competition is not obviously 
under threat in practice. For example, in the Brown Shoe Co. case, 
Warren CJ observed that large companies, through manufacturing 
increased volumes, can often market products at prices below those of 
smaller independent suppliers: 
"Of course, some of the results of large integrated or chain operations are beneficial 
to consumers. Their expansion is not rendered unlawful by the mere fact that small 
independent stores may be adversely affected ... But we cannot fail to recognise 
Congress's desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, 
locally owned businesses. Congress appreciated that occasionally higher costs and 
prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It 
resolved these competing considerations in favour of decentralisation."65 
These comments were mirrored in Federal Trade Commission v Procter 
& Gamble Co., where Douglas J said: "Congress was aware that some 
mergers which lessen competition may also result in economies, but it 
struck the balance in favour of protecting competition."66 
More recent cases may indicate a less rigid approach, with consumer 
welfare, in addition to the decentralisation of markets, being described by 
the United States Supreme Court as a "traditional concern" of the 
antitrust laws.67 
The Long Title of New Zealand's Commerce Act 1986 states that it is "an 
Act to promote competition in markets within New Zealand", a goal 
which the New Zealand courts have linked to efficiency. For example, in 
Tru Tone Ltd v Festival Records Retail Marketing Ltd, the Court of 
Appeal held that: 
"In terms of the Long Title the Commerce Act is an Act to promote competition in 
markets in New Zealand. It is based on the premise that society's resources are best 
allocated in a competitive market where rivalry between firms ensures maximum 
64The Sherman Act 1890 s 2 prohibits any person "monopolis[ing] or attempting to 
monopolise" any line of trade or commerce. 
65(1962) 370 us 294, 344. 
66(1967) 386 us 568, 580. 
67 Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & William son Tobacco Corp. (1993) 509 US 209, 221. 
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efficiency in the use of resources."68 
These thoughts were echoed and expanded upon by the High Court in 
Union Shipping NZ Ltd v Port Nelson Ltd, where the emphasis placed 
on the promotion of competition and resulting efficiency in the Act was 
again noted, though not without reservation: 
"It is the permission of competition which the court is directed to foster. 
Parliament, as a matter of policy, has decided benefits will flow from that course. 
Whether such is a correct economic or social analysis is not a matter for the court ... 
It is legislation of a type where the court should not hesitate to adopt necessary 
purposive approaches."69 
On the issue of market definition, the court avoided interpreting the Act 
solely as prescribed by economists, instead adopting the approach of the 
High Court of Australia in Queensland Wire Industries Pty. Ltd v 
Broken Hill Pty. Co. Ltd,7° where attempts to precisely define the concept 
of a "market" were resisted: 
"In the end, a court is driven back very much to the statutory direction to apply fact 
and commercial common sense in each case, with the comfort of knowing exact 
delineation may well not be necessary ... The evidence of economists naturally has 
its use, but in a controversial field is to be treated with the caution necessary in 
relation to all expert evidence."71 
Economic evidence must necessarily be given some prominence m 
competition law cases, but the overall scheme of the legislation suggests 
that this should not be to the exclusion of other considerations. While 
efficiency is a primary objective of the Act, the existence of an exception 
to the otherwise blanket prohibition on anticompetitive conduct, in the 
form of authorisations in cases where the likely "benefit to the public" 
outweighs any lessening of competition, indicates that it is not the only 
objective.72 
68[1988) 2 NZLR 352,358, per Richardson J. 
69[1990] 2 NZLR 662, 699-700. 
7D(1989) 167 CLR 177. 
71[1990] 2 NZLR 662, 701. 
72The expression "benefit to the public" in s 61(6) of the Act suggests, on its face, 
something beyond considerations of efficiency. Note, however, the interpretation 
adopted by the Commerce Commission in its Guidelines on Public Benefit (reproduced in 
New Zealand Company Law & Practice (Service No. 159), Auckland, CCH New Zealand 
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Unlike the United States, the stated objective of the Commerce Act - to 
"promote competition" and, by extension, efficiency and consumer 
welfare73 - has never resulted in oligopolistic (or even monopolistic) 
markets being seen as undesirable per se. There is merit in the view that, 
New Zealand being a smaller economy than, for example, the United 
States or even Australia, the legislature of this country was prepared to 
accept higher levels of market concentration than other jurisdictions 
before competition law sanctions would apply.74 Allan, considering the 
market dominance provision of s 36 in particular, notes that 
"If we consider s 36 alongside its Australian counterpart [the Trade Practices Act 
1974 s 46, where the test is for a "substantial degree of market power", rather than 
a "dominant position" in a market], it becomes apparent that the New Zealand 
legislature was prepared to tolerate a higher degree of market power within 
individual firms · before they would meet the threshold of applicability, 
presumably because of the smaller economy and consequent concentration of 
markets. Substantial market power is necessarily to be tolerated if we are to have 
any firms acting at or near economies of scale. This approach allows firms to gain 
Ltd (1995), 'JI55-865) which emphasises "efficiency gains". This view is supported by the 
New Zealand Business Roundtable, Antitrust in New Zealand: The Case for Reform, 
Paper prepared for the New Zealand Business Roundtable (1988), p127, and Pickford, 
"Competition Policy, Mergers and the Net Social Benefit Test", in Bollard (ed.), The 
Economics of the Commerce Act, New Zealand Institute of Economic Research Monograph 
No. 52 (1989), p113-114: "The Commerce Act's explicit promotion of the competition goal 
has been interpreted to include consumer welfare and economic efficiency objectives. 
However, ... the efficiency objective can sometimes conflict with the other ... The 
qualification of the Act's pro-competitive stance is thus justified where mergers, for 
example, yield efficiency benefits larger than the detriments from less competition and 
consumer welfare" (emphasis added). Easton, "The Public Interest in Competition 
Policy", in Bollard (ed.), The Economics of the Commerce Act, New Zealand Institute of 
Economic Research Monograph No. 52 (1989), p69-71, responds to this by saying that the 
Act is not, and was not intended to be, a "value-free" piece of legislation. In Telecom 
Corp. of New Zealand Ltd v Commerce Commission (1991) 4 TCLR 473, the High Court 
adopted what seems to be a suitably balanced view of the issue. Citing Re Queensland 
Co-operative Milling Association Ltd (1976) 8 ALR 481, 510, the court endorsed a very 
broad approach to the identification of public benefits flowing from business acquisitions. 
It held that it was undesirable to put limits on what the concept encompasses, and that 
"anything of value to the community generally" could be included. Particular note was, 
however, made of the economic goals of efficiency and progress, which the court saw as 
beneficial in themselves, regardless of how they were distributed among members of the 
?ublic. 
3See Easton, "The Public Interest in Competition Policy", and Pickford, "Competition 
Policy, Mergers and the Net Social Benefit Test", in Bollard (ed.), above n72, p69-71 and 
113-114 respectively. 
74This is, in fact, an inevitable consequence of the emphasis placed on efficiency under 
the New Zealand Act. It is obviously inefficient to have large numbers of competing firms 
in many New Zealand markets. 
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significant market power, at the expense of competition at least to some extent, 
before they will be within the threshold test of s 36."75 
Brock, arguing for a less regulatory approach to competition policy, also 
refers to the likelihood that markets will naturally be more concentrated 
in a smaller country, and observes that economies of scale and scope 
may loom larger in the minds of regulators than the possibility of tacit 
collusion among oligopolists, given the growing importance of 
international competitiveness in an increasingly open world 
economy. 76 The New Zealand Government's recent policy of 
deregulating and / or privatising long established State-owned 
monopolies in areas such as telecommunications and domestic air 
transport has, despite the entry of some new competitors, also inevitably 
resulted in high levels of market concentration in these industries. In 
the words of Farrar, 
"It was the fourth labour Government's policy when enacting the Commerce Act 
that it should apply generally. This Act underpinned the Government's radical 
liberalisation programme that abolished many of the regulatory regimes that had 
long been a feature of the New Zealand economy ... Rather than creating new 
regulatory bodies to oversee [State-owned enterprises], the Labour Government 
placed its faith in the Comm erce Act's ability to curb any attempt by the newly 
privatised dominant firms to enter into anticompetitive arrangements or engage in 
predatory conduct."77 
This comparatively "light-handed" approach, generally focusing on the 
actual effects of a particular practice or market situation rather than 
primarily on structural factors, is supported by Brock. Ideally, he would 
liberalise New Zealand's competition policy even more, removing all 
"per se" liability under the Commerce Act.78 
75 Shifting Ground Within the Commerce A ct: Is the N eed for Collu sion Dead? (1996) 
Victoria University of Wellington LLM Research Paper, p60. 
76 Above n8, p3. 
77"Closer Economic Relations and Harmonisation of Law between Australia and New 
Zealand", in Joseph (ed.), Essays Oil the Constitution, Wellington, Brookers (1995), p173-
174. See also Jennings and Cameron, "State-owned Enterprise Reform in New Zealand", in 
Bollard and Buckle (eds.), Economic Liberalisation in N ew Z ealand, Wellington, Allen 
& Unwin Ltd in association with Port Nicholson Press (1987), p121. 
78"If you prohibit [a] practice, you shut off the option of experimenting with the practice 
during the period of prohibition. Since the law is sluggish, the period of prohibition is 
likely to be long ... In a rapidly changing world, the 'option value' of this lost period of 
experimentation is typically greater than in a quiet world where little is changing ... 
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B Anticompetitive Conduct in the Petrol Industry (I) 
The theoretical and potential anticompetitive effects of oligopolies are 
detailed above.79 These include the incentives to enter, and then not to 
"cheat" on expressly or tacitly collusive pricing and production 
arrangements; the greater likelihood that inferior, less efficient, 
technologies will be used; and the resulting economic and social costs -
higher prices and less diversity of output. If these effects can be shown to 
occur in practice, a good case can be made that competition (and 
therefore efficiency and consumer welfare) has been harmed, and that 
competition law has a role to play. 
In this regard, the New Zealand petrol industry80 has been the subject of 
close scrutiny in recent months by a number of local and international 
agencies. In May 1997 the International Energy Agency (IEA), a body 
established within the framework of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) to encourage energy 
conservation and stability in international energy markets, released a 
review of New Zealand's energy policies. While concluding that the 
Government's recent deregulation and privatisation policies were 
"bearing fruit, in the form of increased efficiency, lower costs and 
enhanced consumer choice and service"81 in the energy industry as a 
whole, the IEA expressed some concerns about certain aspects of the way 
in which the deregulated industry was operating. In particular, the 
degree of market concentration and price levels relative to other 
countries in the New Zealand retail petrol market raised significant 
concerns about the strength of competition in that market. There are, the 
IEA concluded, 
This argues for allowing more practices and being 'bolder' in allowing practices in a 
rapidly changing world": Above n8, p6-7. 
79see text accompanying n6-9 and n38-43. 
80other markets in which the anticompetitive effects of an oligopolistic structure have 
recently been noted include those for air transport, the news media and electricity supply: 
see Feldman, "Some Call it Oligopoly" (1996) 33 Air Transport World 45; Brown, 
Co111mercial Media in Australia, Brisbane, University of Queensland Press (1986), pll; 
Garnham, "The Media and the Public Sphere" (1986) 14 Intermedia 28, 33; Schultz, 
Media Ownership, Report of the Australian Centre for Independent Journalism, 
University of Technology, Sydney (1991); and International Energy Agency, Energy 
Policies of IEA Countries: New Zealand 1997 Review, Paris, OECD Publication Service 
(1997), p75. 
81International Energy Agency, above n80, p9. 
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"grounds for suspecting oligopolistic pricing behaviour by the four oil companies 
that dominate the industry. There are entry barriers to the New Zealand market, 
resulting from the high cost of installing port terminals, bulk storage facilities and 
new retail outlets, such that the companies may be able to continue to make 
oligopoly profits without the threat of competition from independent importers 
and retailers. "82 
New Zealand's retail petrol market was deregulated in 1988. This 
involved the removal of such controls as price ceilings, and restrictions 
on the ownership of storage facilities and retail outlets. The IEA notes 
that the four dominant firms - Caltex, Mobil, Shell and BP - now own all 
the bulk storage facilities and most of the retail stations, as well as 
supplying a small number of independent retailers. There is currently 
no legal provision for independent operators to have mandatory access 
to the established firms' storage and terminal facilities. 83 Such access 
would be required if the petrol industry was dominated by a single 
monopolistic supplier just as, for example, Telecom was required to 
grant Clear access to its telecommunications network to avoid 
contravention of s 36 of the Commerce Act.84 
On the issue of price, it was noted in the IEA review that the "importer 
margin", that is the difference between New Zealand wholesale prices 
and Singapore export prices85 (lagged by eight weeks to account for 
shipping time), had declined immediately after deregulation, but had 
risen steadily since 1990, particularly rapidly since 1994. The New 
Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER), in a report to the 
82At p55. 
83At p47. 
84See Telecom Corp. of New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd [1995] 1 NZLR 385, 
390 and van Roy, "The Privy Council Decision in Telecom v Clear: Narrowing the 
A,?cplication of s 36 of the Commerce Act 1986" [1995] NZLJ 54. 
8 Singapore was chosen as an appropriate reference point because of its importance as a 
refining centre (being the third largest in the world) and its close proximity to New 
Zealand. Although the oil companies themselves dispute its suitability (see, for 
example, Scott, Conditions of Entry into Petrol Importing, Wholesaling and Retailing in 
New Zealand, Report Commissioned by Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd, in association with 
Law and Economics Consulting Group Inc., (1997), p12-13), it is seen as being "ideally 
suited to providing a world reference point for oil and petroleum products" by the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the Australian Institute of 
Petroleum, the New Zealand Ministry of Commerce and the New Zealand Institute of 
Economic Research, as well as the IEA: New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, 
Petrol Prices: An Investigation into Petrol Prices in New Zealand, Report to the Ministry 
of Commerce (1996), p6. 
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Ministry of Commerce prepared in November 1996, also notes that not 
only is there a significant difference between the cost of landed imported 
product plus the minimum necessary distribution and retailing costs,86 
and the price actually charged at the pump, but that this gap has 
increased by approximately 1.1 cents per litre per year since 1992. This 
upward trend is indicated on the graph below:87 
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Another sign that the competitive gains from deregulation have been 
lost is that New Zealand's pre-tax retail petrol prices are now among the 
highest in the OECD, as indicated in the table below. This shows the 
average petrol prices in OECD countries for the years immediately before 
86The NZIER's assessment is that, if the petrol companies were competing strongly with 
each other, retail prices should settle at this level in the long run: Petrol Prices: An Investiga tion into Petrol Prices in New Zealand, Report to the Ministry of Commerce 
(1996), pl-2 and 4. 
87 Adapted from New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, above n85, p2. Not 
surprisingly, the petrol companies take issue with the NZIER's interpretation of this data. Dr Graham Scott, in a report commissioned by Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd, refers 
to the "statistically determined break in trend" which the NZIER estimates to have 
occurred early in 1990, and says that it should have determined whether this break was 
the only such possible break in the data: "It is possible - indeed likely - that a number of 
other possible 's tatistical beaks' may lurk within the data ... Without analysis it is 
certainly premature to attribute such a break to any particular causes ... There could be other and more valid explanations for [the observed upward trend] than NZIER's 
hypothesis of anti-competitive pricing by industry participants ... The depressed 
[margins] during 1990-1993 may have been the result of local excess capacity, which 
(since demand for petrol is price-inelastic) would tend to depress prices. Higher [margins] since 1994 may reflect nothing more than the fact that local demand has caught up with, 
and exceeded, local supply": above n85, p6 and 10. 
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deregulation of the New Zealand industry (1985-1988), around the time 
deregulation took place (1989-1992) and after deregulation (1993-1995).88 
The figures indicate that petrol prices in New Zealand relative to other 
OECD nations fell for the period immediately after deregulation, but 
have risen again since 1993.89 
Pre-tax Petrol Prices for OECD Countries: 1988-1995 
Average Price Average Price Average Price 
Countrv 1985-1988 Rank 1989-1992 Rank 1993-1995 
Canada 71.8 1 58.3 3 59.2 
Japan 67.4 2 74 1 88.6 
Finland 58.7 3 63.8 2 44 
New Zealand 48.4 4 46.2 11 49.3 
Sweden 45.5 5 54.6 4 39.2 
Ireland 44.7 6 51 7 48.7 
Austria 43.6 7 53.5 5 51 
Norway 43.3 8 53.5 6 56.3 
Portugal 41.4 9 44.7 15 41 
Holland 40.7 10 48.8 9 45.1 
Luxembourg 38.l 11 50.6 8 41.6 
Spain 38.1 11 44 17 42.8 
Denmark 38.1 11 46.9 10 47.5 
Switzerland 37.8 14 46.2 11 43.4 
Australia 37.4 15 41.8 20 34.7 
Belgium 37.0 16 45.5 13 44.5 
United Kingdom 35.6 17 44.4 16 37.6 
Italy 34.8 18 45.5 13 42.2 
Germany 34.5 19 42.2 18 40.4 
Greece 33.7 20 38.1 21 34.6 
France 31.2 21 37.8 22 32.9 
88Adapted from New Zealand Institute of Economic Research, above n85, pl0-11. Prices 
are in real 1995 New Zealand cents per litre, before tax. 
89These figures are disputed by the oil companies. A survey undertaken by Shell of its 
outlets around the world shows New Zealand's prices to be "in the middle of the pack" of 
around twenty countries. The variation between the Shell study and the IEA and NZIER 
reports may be due to the times when price data was collected, according to Shell New 
Zealand Ltd chairman Charles Harrison: Weir, "NZ Petrol Prices Among the World's 
Highest, says Agency", Dominion, Wellington, 13 May 1997, pl. 
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United States 30.4 22 32.6 23 32.8 
Turkey 14.7 23 42 19 32.9 
Mexico - - - - 40.9 
In both absolute and relative terms, New Zealand's retail petrol prices 
are now at similar levels to those prevailing just prior to deregulation. 
Recent trends suggest that prices are likely to continue rising, and that 
these increases will continue to outstrip increases in costs. These points 
led the NZIER to conclude that the market for petrol in New Zealand is 
not a competitive one, and that the major companies were earning 
significant supranormal profits, resulting in harm to both consumer 
welfare and industry efficiency: 
"For every 1 cent per litre increase in the price of petrol, the oil companies' 
combined revenue increases by approximately $27 million per annum ... Current 
margins may be 6 cents per litre higher than the levels established after 
deregulation. If this is a rough measure of the degree to which competitive 
pressures are failing, then total oil company revenue may now be too high by about 
$160 million per annum ... In addition, there is a small dead weight loss of 
approximately $1 million per annum for a 6 cent per litre excess in price .. . In 
competitive conditions, one would expect to see margins squeezed over time, not 
increasing. Margins can only be increased above competitive levels if there are 
barriers to entry ... Increased margins suggest at least tacit collusion."90 
Despite these apparently anticompetitive outcomes, it appears that the 
petrol companies would currently be successful in defending any action 
brought against them pursuant to the Commerce Act 1986. The 
difficulties in applying the provisions of the Act to oligopolies arise 
from the approach taken by the New Zealand courts to the key issues of 
what constitutes a "contract, arrangement or understanding", and what 
amounts to a "dominant position in a market" in terms of the Act. The 
alternative interpretations given to these concepts, and their potential 
application to the conduct of the major petrol companies, are considered 
below. 
90Above n85, p13-14. While the oil companies themselves take issue with the data used, 
the statistical methods employed, and the conclusions reached by the NZIER and other 
agencies such as the Ministry of Commerce and the IEA, the consensus among these 
agencies is that the companies' pricing policies are anticompetitive, and suggest tacit 
collusion. 
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IV COMPETITION LAW RESPONSES 
A Market Dominance Provisions 
Section 36 of the Commerce Act regulates the "use" of a "dominant 
position in a market". Such a position may not be used to restrict entry 
into, prevent or deter competitive conduct in, or eliminate any person 
from that or any other market.91 
The wording of s 36 derives from that used in the Treaty establishing the 
European Community,92 and may be contrasted with the apparently 
lower threshold in the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974.93 
Some guidance is given in s 3(8) and (9) of the New Zealand Act as to 
when a person has a dominant position in a market for the purposes of 
the above sections. Dominance is equated with the ability to exert a 
"dominant influence" over the production, acquisition, supply or price 
of goods or services in a market. In assessing the degree of influence 
which the person or group has, regard is given to such matters as market 
share, technical knowledge, access to materials and capital; and the 
extent to which that person is constrained by the conduct of competitors, 
potential competitors, suppliers or purchasers in the market. 
l New Zealand and Australian cases 
The approach taken in early New Zealand cases such as Re News Ltd & 
Independent Newspapers Ltd94 and Re Magnum Corp. Ltd & Dominion 
Breweries Ltd95 relied heavily on economic definitions of "dominance", 
91 The term also appears ins 47 of the Act, which prohibits acquisitions of business assets 
or shares which result in the gaining or strengthening of a dominant position. 
92Treaty of Rome article 86, which prohibits "any abuse by one or more undertakings of a 
dominant position within the Common Market or in a substantial part of it". 
93Section 46 of the Australian Act (Misuse of Market Power) prohibits corporations 
"taking advantage" of a "substantial degree of power in a market" for similar purposes to 
those given in s 36 of the Commerce Act. Section 50 prohibits business acquisitions which 
result in a "substantial lessening of competition". Both of these sections were amended in 
1986, substituting the present wording for the previous tests based on "substantial control" 
and "dominance" of a market respectively. 
94(1986) 6 NZAR 47 (Commerce Commission Decision No. 164). 
95(1986) 2 TCLR 177 (Commerce Commission Decision No. 182). 
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mirroring the approach taken m leading European Community 
decisions. Economic literature equates "dominance" with high levels of 
"market power",96 a term which is commonly defined as "the ability of a 
firm to raise its prices above the competitive level without driving away 
so many customers as to make the price increase unprofitable".97 A 
similar view of dominance was adopted in News Ltd, where the 
Commission held that 
"A person can be considered to have a domirnmt influence in a market when that 
person is able to make significant business decisions, particularly those relating to 
price and supply, without regard to the competitors, suppliers or customers of that 
person ... It may reasonably be inferred that this ability to act independently is 
presumed to arise only where there is an absence of competition".98 
In Magnum Corp. Ltd99 the Commission at first instance discussed the 
distinction between the s 27 prohibition on contracts, arrangements and 
understandings which have the purpose or effect of "substantially 
lessening competition" and the s 36 and 47 prohibition on using or 
acquiring a "dominant position in a market", and concluded that the 
dominance test appears to set the higher standard. The Commission 
again stressed 
"Independence of behaviour, ... a lack of restraint on the behaviour of the dominant 
party - restraint that would be assumed to be associated with conditions of 
effective competition."100 
Similarly, on an application for judicial review of the Commission's 
decision, the High Court stated that: 
"Undertakings are in a dominant position when they have the power to behave 
96ttampton, "Section 36(1) of the Colllmerce Act 1986: An Analysis of its Constituent 
Elements", in Ahdar (ed.) , Competition Law and Policy in N ew Z ealand, North Ryde, 
The Law Book Co. Ltd (1991), p186. 
97Landes and Posner, "Market Power in Antitrust Cases" (1981) 94 Harvard Law Rev 937. 
98(1986) 6 NZAR 47, 50 (emphasis added) . In a later decision, the Commission tempered 
this unqualified "independence of behaviour" formulation somewhat by stating that "no 
person, not even a monopolist, acts [completely] without regard to competitors, suppliers 
or customers .. . Dominance exists where a person ... can behave to a large extent 
independently of that person's competitors": Re Broadcast Communications Ltd [1990) 
NZAR 433,448 (Commerce Commission Decision No. 248). 
99(1986) 2 TCLR 177. 
lOOAt 196 (emphasis added). 
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independently, which puts them in a position to act without taking into account 
their competitors, purchasers or suppliers",101 
citing Re Continental Can Co. Inc.,10 2 an influential European case 
where such independence was seen as an inevitable consequence of such 
structural factors as market share, access to technology and materials, etc. 
Davison CJ agreed with the Commission that its "economic" approach 
should override the ordinary dictionary meaning of "dominance", and 
that "the concept of dominance must be looked at in a market context", 
ie. "as having sufficient market power to behave to an appreciable extent 
in a discretionary manner ... This interpretation stresses independence of 
behaviour".103 
Hampton has stated that this interpretation leaves "little scope" for 
applying s 36 to the aggregated power of two or more firms in a market, 
but does not discount the possibility entirely: 
"The concept of an 'association of persons'104 probably does not extend to 'shared 
monopoly', that is, where two or more unrelated firms, each of whom is 
individually not in a position to dominate a market but who together control a 
dominant portion of the market, act to protect that position by restraining 
competition. The omission of any specific provision for the control of oligopolies, 
such as that which was in Part III of the Commerce Act 1975,105 reinforces this 
view. If the legislature had intended s 36 to apply to joint dominance, it could 
have used the words 'one or more persons' instead of 'a person'. While the section 
does not specifically cover joint dominance, circumstances could arise in a tightly 
oligopolistic market in which more than one firm could arguably be said to be in a 
position to exercise a dominant influence over the market."106 
lOiuon Corp. Ltd v Commerce Commission [1987] 2 NZLR 682, 691 (emphasis added). See 
also Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 647, 679 and 
Land, "Monopolisation: The Practical Implications of Section 36 of the Commerce Act 
1986" (1988) 18 VUWLR 51, 56. 
102[1972] CMLR Dll, D17; affirmed on appeal by the European Court of Justice [1973] ECR 
215. 
103[1987] 2 NZLR 682, 690 (emphasis added). 
104For the purposes of the Commerce Act, "person" includes "any association of persons 
whether incorporated or not": s 2(1). 
lOSsections 61 and 62 of that Act allowed the Minister of Trade and Industry to make 
orders regulating any "complete or partial monopoly or oligopoly", which was found by 
the Commission to be contrary to the public interest. 
106"Section 36(1) of the Commerce Act 1986: An Analysis of its Constituent Elements", in 
Ahdar (ed.), above n96, p183. 
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Case law prior to 1992 also allows for the possibility that two or more 
firms - particularly in an oligopolistic market - could effectively achieve 
joint dominance. In Magnum Corp. Ltd the Commission implied that, 
in a highly concentrated market where participants are not "disciplined" 
by their competitor's presence and actions, more than one firm could be 
dominant in terms of the Act,107 and in Tytel Pty. Ltd v Australian 
Telecommunications Commission, Jackson J said that "the terms of s 
46(1) [of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974] do not seem necessarily 
to require that only one corporation satisfy the test at any one time".108 
These comments were made with regard to the pre-1986 test under the 
Australian Act, a test not dissimilar to that under s 36. 
However, in more recent cases, this economic interpretation has been 
rejected in favour of a "dictionary" approach to the question of 
dominance. This may be traced to the Court of Appeal's decision in 
Telecom Corp. of New Zealand Ltd v Commerce Commission,109 a case 
turning on whether Telecom was dominant in the cellular telephone 
market. The High Court,110 in line with the approach taken in previous 
decisions, had held that dominance should be equated with "high 
market power", that "the essence of market power is discretionary 
power, the discretion to adopt production and selling policies different 
from those that a competitive market would constrain", and that market 
structure - "a firm's external competitive environment" - was the 
primary determinant of market power. 
In the Court of Appeal, Cooke P held that the expression "high market 
power" was too low a test, if by this the High Court meant something 
less than 
"a prevailing, commanding, ascendant, governing, primary, principal or leading 
influence ... Clearly there could be no more than one dominant influence over each 
of the aspects of a market specified in the Act".11 1 
Richardson J took a similar approach. He also criticised the High Court 
107(1986) 2 TCLR 177, 196. 
108(1986) 67 ALR 433, 437. 
109[1992] 3 NZLR 429. 
llOTelecom Corp. of New Zealand Ltd v Commerce Commission (1991) 4 TCLR 473. 
111[1992] 3 NZLR 429, 434 (emphasis added) . 
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for equating words like "high", "large" and "appreciable" with 
"dominant", and said: 
"Clearly the dominance test sets a rigorous threshold. It is not sufficient that the 
influence be advantageous or powerful. It must be dominant. The word comes from 
the Latin dominus meaning master. Only one person can be dominant in a particular 
aspect of a market at any one time. Not surprisingly standard dictionaries give 
meanings such as 'ruling', 'governing', 'commanding', 'reigning', 'ascendant', 
'prevailing' and 'paramount"'.11 2 
In Commerce Commission v Port Nelson Ltd,113 McGechan J noted that 
previous case law on the meaning of dominance could be divided into 
two broad categories - those cases employing a definition derived from 
"economics usage", and those using the ordinary or dictionary meaning 
of the word. 
He drew attention to the preference shown for the economic 
interpretation by the European courts and in early New Zealand cases, 
an affinity which he traced to the origins of ss 3(8) and (9) and 36 of the 
Commerce Act in article 86 of the European Community Treaty and Re 
Continental Can Co. Inc.114 
His Honour then noted how the Court of Appeal m the Telecom case 
had 
"rejected the developing 'economics' based standard ... , and adopted a standard 
derived from dictionary meaning ... equat[ing] 'dominance ' to 'commanding' or 
'ruling'; a very high standard i.ndeed",115 
and one which he was bound to follow. He concluded that dominance 
involves "a high degree of market control", but that "some degree of 
background market realism" should be taken into account: 
"To be dominant, the firm must be able to act, within the limits of commercial 
reality, without significant competitive constraints. Within that, the firm must be 
112At p442 (emphasis added). 
113(1995) 6 TCLR 406; affirmed by the Court of Appeal [1996] 3 NZLR 554. 
114At p436-437. 
115 At p439. 
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able to dictate more adverse terms of trading to any significant competitors or 
suppliers. It is to this dictatorial element the concept of 'command' primarily is 
directed ... One commands when all who matter necessarily follow".1 16 
The Australian test of a "substantial degree of power in a market" or (in 
the case of business acquisitions) a "substantial lessening of competition" 
is, as noted above, now certainly lower than in New Zealand.117 
Some Australian cases on the previous "dominance" test seem to have 
put undue emphasis on structural factors such as market share, without 
taking adequate account of the actual competitive restraints a firm 
faces, 118 but in general the Australian approach has been in line with 
that applied in New Zealand prior to the Court of Appeal decision in 
Telecom. For example, in the QCMA case119 the Trade Practices Tribunal 
held that s 46 took effect when a firm "is sufficiently free from market 
pressures to 'administer' its own production and selling policies at its 
discretion", such discretion arising from the structure of the market. 
This was followed in Queensland Wire Industries Ltd v Broken Hill Pty. 
Ltd, where the High Court of Australia described market power as: 
"The ability of a firm to raise prices above the supply cost without rivals taking 
away customers in due time ... A firm possesses market power when it can behave 
persistently in a manner different from the behaviour that a competitive market 
would enforce on a firm facing otherwise similar cost and demand conditions."120 
2 European Community 
Unlike New Zealand, where the application of market dominance 
116At p441-442. 
117The amendments toss 46 and 50 were made because "a corporation does not need to be 
able to dominate a market to satisfy the s 46 threshold. That is too high a degree of 
market power": Trade Practices Revision Bill 1986 Explanatory Memorandum, cited in 
Corones, above n2, p120. 
118see, for example, McLean v Shell Chemical (Australia) Pty. Ltd (1984) 2 FCR 593 and 
Williams v Papersave Pty. Ltd (1987) 16 FCR 69. 
ll9Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd (1976) 8 ALR 481, 515. 
120(1989) 167 CLR 177, 189 & 200. See also Dowling v Dalgety Australia Ltd (1992) 34 
FCR 1; QIW Retailers Ltd v David's Holdings Pty. Ltd (1994) 49 FCR 211; and Trade 
Practices Commission, Misuse of Market Power Background Paper, Canberra, Trade 
Practices Commission (1990), para. 15, where the Commission defined market power as 
"the ability to be able to act with some degree of freedom from competitive restraints, 
exerted by its actual or potential competitors, suppliers and customers". 
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provisions to oligopolies now appears very unlikely, and Australia, 
where their application remains uncertain at best, the European 
Community's dominance test in article 86 of the EC Treaty specifically 
refers to "abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position". 
The approach taken still appears to be based on cases like Continental 
Can, along with the later decisions in United Brands Co. Inc. v European 
Commission 121 and Hoffman-La Roche & Co. v European 
Commission,122 to which reference was made in earlier New Zealand 
cases in support of the "independence of behaviour" interpretation.1 23 
For example, a 1993 article on market dominance limits its treatment of 
the test under article 86 of the EC Treaty to a consideration of these three 
cases,124 and the recent Tetra Pakl 25 case does not appear to depart from 
the interpretation adopted in these earlier decisions: 
"Dominant positions are not just enjoyed by large companies. Even comparatively 
minor enterprises may find themselves able to control a particularly narrow 
market .. . The decision in Tetra Pak should be of note to all companies who are able 
to operate in a market without having to have particular regard to activities of 
their competitors".126 
As well as the general provision of article 86, mergers which create or 
strengthen a dominant position are also subject to the European 
Community Merger Regulation 1989. Although both provisions refer to 
a "dominant position", the test for merger control makes no explicit 
121(1978] 1 CMLR 429. 
122(1979] 3 CMLR 211. 
l23These three cases were referred to, for example, in Lion Corp. Ltd v Commerce 
Commission (1987] 2 NZLR 682, 688-689; Re Broadcast Communications Ltd (1990] NZAR 
433, 448; Telecom Corp . of New Zealand Ltd v Commerce Commission (1991) 4 TCLR 473; 
and Commerce Commission v Port Nelson Ltd (1995) 6 TCLR 406. 
124Patterson, "The Rise & Fall of a Dominant Position in New Zealand Competition 
Law: From Economic Concept to Latin Derivation" (1993) NZULR 265, 267-271. 
l25Tetra Pak International v European Commission (1992] 4 CMLR 551; affirmed by the 
European Court of First Instance (1997] 4 CMLR 726. 
126Singleton, "Abuse of a Dominant Position" (1992) 142 NLJ 1000. An example of joint 
dominance under article 86 appears in the "Magill" case, Radio Telefi s Eireann v 
European Commission (1995] 4 CMLR 718. This case concerned three television companies 
operating in Ireland and Northern Ireland who had refused to license the copyright in 
their programme listings to Magill TV Guide Ltd, an independent publisher wishing to 
produce a comprehensive weekly TV guide. The European Court of Justice held that the 
defendants had jointly breached article 86, by inhibiting the creation of a new product 
and monopolising the derivative TV guide market: See van Melle, "Refusals to License 
Intellectual Property Rights: The Impact of RTE v EC Commission (Magill) on Australian 
and New Zealand Competition Law" (1997) 25 ABLR 4. 
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reference to the possibility of dominance by more than one firm.1 27 In its 
first year of operation, this apparent loophole led the European 
Commission to effectively ignore the possibility of joint dominance 
among oligopolists in merger cases,128 with clearance being given in a 
number of cases involving high market concentrations, without detailed 
assessment of the possibility of collusion. The existence of competitors 
with similarly high market shares to the merged firm was regarded by 
the Commission as an indication of their ability to influence its 
behaviour and prevent sufficiently independent conduct.129 
However, since the 1992 Nestle case,130 the European Commission has 
shown a willingness to intervene to control oligopolies under the 
merger regulation, by interpreting it to include situations of joint 
dominance. That case involved a takeover bid by Nestle, a Swiss-based 
multinational food company, for Perrier, a French company which 
distributes bottled mineral water. 
The merger was challenged on the grounds that it would strengthen the 
"jointly held dominant position" of Nestle and its nearest rival (BSN) in 
the French bottled water market, and that this was likely to harm the 
interests of consumers. Even before the merger the market was highly 
127Dupre, EEC Merger Control and the Oligopoly: Legal and Economic Analysis in the 
Light of the American Experience, Florence, European Universities Institute Monographs 
in Law No. 1 (1993), pl; Morgan, "The Treatment of Oligopoly under the European Merger 
Control Regulation" (1996) 41 Antitrust Bulletin 203, 208. 
128Ridyard, "Joint Dominance and the Oligopoly Blind Spot under the EC Merger 
Relfulation" (1992) 13 ECLR 161. 
12 For example, in Re Renault & Volvo (Unreported, Decision of the European 
Commission, 7 November 1990), the first case to be decided under the regulation, a merger 
was allowed between two large car and truck manufacturers despite the industry's 
oligopolistic structure, in which as few as three significant suppliers were present in some 
submarkets. Similarly, in Re Mitsubishi & UCAR (Unreported, Decision of the European 
Commission, 14 January 1991), a merger was cleared which gave the resulting firm a 35-
40% share in the European market for graphite electrodes. The firm's two closest 
competitors held market shares of between 15-25% each, giving a three firm 
concentration of around 75%, with no other large competitors. In Re Alcatel & AEG Kabel 
(Unreported, Decision of the European Commission, 18 December 1991), the possible 
application of the merger regulation to an oligopoly was explicitly mentioned for the 
first time, but rejected on similar grounds to those relied on in the New Zealand case of 
Magnum Corp. Ltd (1986) 2 TCLR 177, 196 - that there was no evidence of a lack of 
effective competition despite the oligopolistic structure. 
130Re Nestle & Perrier (Unreported, Decision of the European Commission, 22 July 1992); 
affirmed by the European Court of First Instance, 27 April 1995; discussed by Morgan, 
"The Treatment of Oligopoly under the European Merger Control Regulation" (1996) 41 
Antitrust Bulletin 203, 223-232 and Raffaelli, "Oligopolies and Antitrust Law" (1996) 19 
Fordham International LJ 915, 927-932. 
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concentrated, with Perrier, BSN and Nestle accounting for nearly 95% of 
French mineral water sales. Prices charged by these firms had risen 
steadily and in parallel over the previous five years, with Perrier 
apparently acting as price leader. There was also evidence of joint entry-
deterring behaviour by the market leaders to protect the established 
oligopoly. Morgan notes that applicability of the "kinked demand" 
model131 to this situation: 
"The incentive for coordinated pricing is greater in markets with low price 
elasticity of demand (where price increases are met with a smaller than 
proportionate fall in quantity demanded, resulting in higher revenues for 
producers) ... The Commission noted that the past behaviour of prices suggested 
that mineral water suppliers had already recognised the possibility of increasing 
profits by jointly increasing prices, and that the merger was seen as increasing the 
likelihood of Nestle and BSN jointly maintaining high prices or even raising them 
further. "132 
The Commission concluded that many of the classic conditions 
facilitating oligopolistic coordination were present in this case, and that 
"The maintenance or development of whatever competition there remains in that 
market therefore requires particular protection. Any structural operation 
restricting even more the scope for competition in such a situation has to be judged 
severe! y. "133 
The likelihood of joint dominance is now discussed as a matter of course 
in European merger cases,134 although an oligopolistic market structure 
is not treated as determinative of the issue. Each case since Nestle has 
been considered on its own merits, with the Commission making an 
assessment of whether the members of an oligopoly are likely to 
compete as a result of a merger, or act together to jointly dominate the 
industry .135 
131See text accompanying n23-29 above. 
132"The Treatment of Oligopoly under the European Merger Control Regulation" (1996) 
41 Antitrust Bulletin 203, 225. 
133'1[118 of the decision, cited by Morgan, "The Treatment of Oligopoly under the 
European Merger Control Regulation" (1996) 41 Antitrust Bulletin 203, 229. 
134Morgan, "The Treatment of Oligopoly under the European Merger Control Regulation" 
(1996) 41 Antitrust Bulletin 203, 233. 
135Morgan, "The Treatment of Oligopoly under the European Merger Control Regulation" 
(1996) 41 Antitrust Bulletin 203, 242; Raffaelli, "Oligopolies and Antitrust Law" (1996) 
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3 United States 
Mergers in the United States are subject to the Clayton Act 1914 s 7, 
which prohibits mergers or acquisitions that substantially lessen 
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce. 
Although early cases brought under this provision tended to view 
oligopolies as "shared monopolies" and to treat them as unlawful per se 
at times, the test currently applied is similar to that used in the European 
cases. The Sherman Act 1890 is framed in similar terms,136 but its 
applicability to oligopolies is not so clear cut. 
An early discussion of the issue appears in United States v E.I. Du Pont 
de Nemours & Co.,137 a case brought pursuant to the Sherman Act s 2. 
Leahy DJ, in the District Court, noted that all practicable forms of 
competition are in fact "imperfect", lying between the theoretical 
economic concepts of perfect competition and monopoly and possessing, 
in varying degrees, monopolistic characteristics. He defined "monopoly 
power" as consisting of the ability to arbitrarily raise prices or exclude 
competitors,138 and immediately went on to describe the features of 
oligopolies, and their potentially anticompetitive nature, as follows: 
"There is much debate among economists with respect to market behaviour in 
industries which are oligopolistic. While some economists take the view that ... 
oligopolies controvert the spirit of the antitrust laws, others contend that 
oligopolies are able to pass along the benefit of efficiency of size to the consumer 
and are not socially disadvantageous. Some admit that, in oligopolistic industries, 
a considerably higher degree of competition than that which exists would be 
'workable' or effective."139 
19 Fordham International LJ 915, 927. See, for example, Re Kali und Salz, MdK & 
Treuhand (Unreported, Decision of the European Commission, 14 December 1993), where a 
merger in an oligopolistic market was allowed with conditions; and Re Pilkington-
Techint & SIV (Unreported, Decision of the European Commission, 21 December 1993) and 
Re Mannesmann, Vallourec & Ilva (Unreported, Decision of the European Commission, 31 
January 1994), both approved unconditionally. 
136section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolisation, attempted monopolisation 
and conspiracy to monopolise in any market. 
137Known as the "cellophane case" (1953) 118 FSupp 41 ; affirmed by the Supreme Court 
(1956) 351 us 377. 
l 38(1953) 118 FSupp 41, 54, following United States v Aluminium Co. of America (1945) 
148 F2d 416, 429. 
139(1953) 118 FSupp 41, 49, citing Fellner, above n13, p290. Fellner says that "the degree 
of competition which oligopolistic firms consider to be desirable from their own point of 
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In stating that "monopoly ... , in economics, 1s not the simple test of 
perfect monopoly", and apparently including oligopoly in his widened 
definition, Leahy DJ seems to suggest that the Sherman Act prohibition 
on "monopolisation" could be extended to oligopolies. 
Since then, however, no United States court has been willing to confirm 
the applicability of s 2 to a "shared monopoly" situation. In Shapiro v 
General Motors Corp., Young DJ referred to the "uncertain success which 
the Justice Department is likely to have" in prosecuting large companies 
in highly concentrated industries under s 2;1 4 0 while in Harkins 
Amusement Enterprises Inc. v General Cinema Corp., the United States 
Court of Appeals said: 
"Because oligopoly markets - those with few sellers - often exhibit the lack of 
competition, high prices and low output of monopoly markets, commentators141 
have suggested that s 2 could be invoked to attack a shared monopoly even though 
no individual firm possessed the power to control prices or exclude competition .. . 
[The] theory is a novel one ... One court directly addressing the issue stated bluntly, 
'an oligopoly, or a shared monopoly, does not in itself violate s 2 of the Sherman 
Act' ."142 
A more definite view was, however, adopted in Brown Shoe Co. v 
United States,143 a merger case brought under s 7 of the Clayton Act 1914. 
Although the market for shoes was at that time composed of a relatively 
large number of suppliers and retailers, the District Court144 had found a 
"definite trend" towards a few large manufacturers supplying an ever 
increasing proportion of the retail market, thereby foreclosing other 
manufacturers from competing effectively. The proposed merger would, 
view is likely to fall short of the social optimum by a considerable margin". 
140(1979) 472 FSupp 636, 647. 
141see, for example, Turner, "The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory 
Policies" (1969) 82 Harvard Law Rev 1207, 1231; Posner, above nl, at 1595-1598; and Hay, 
"Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly and Antitrust Law" (1982) 67 Cornell Law Rev 439. 
142(1988) 850 F2d 477, 490; citing Terminal Systems Inc. v ITT World Communications Inc. 
(1982) 535 FSupp 225, 228-229. Jelderks J, in Phoenix Electric Co. v National Electrical 
Contractors ' A ssociation (1994) 861 FSupp 1498, 1514 was equally noncommittal on 
whether or not a shared monopoly might ever breach s 2. He found that, as in Harkins, 
the market in question actually consis ted of "numerous sellers", and that therefore the 
issue did not arise. 
143(1962) 370 us 294. 
144(1960) 179 FSupp 721. 
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the court held, result in further substantial lessening of competition and 
an increased tendency towards monopoly. 
This was affirmed by the Supreme Court, with the majority concluding 
that, in enacting antitrust legislation, "Congress was desirous of 
preventing the formation of ... oligopolies, with their attendant adverse 
effects upon local control of industry and upon small business".145 It was 
held that the trend in the market was toward oligopoly, and that the 
present competitive "vigour" in the industry could not immunise the 
merger from illegality under the Clayton Act. 
The judgments in Federal Trade Commission v Procter & Gamble Co. 146 
present a mix of attitudes towards the regulation of mergers involving 
oligopolies. Harlan J favoured per se illegality, in line with Brown Shoe 
Co., while the majority took a more effects-based approach. 
The Commission had challenged a business acquisition by Procter 
which, together with its two nearest competitors, accounted for 80% of 
the national soap, detergent and cleanser market, under s 7 of the 
Clayton Act. The Commission contended that the acquisition would 
dissuade new entrants to the liquid bleach market, discourage active 
competition from those firms already in the industry for fear of 
retaliation from Procter, and diminish potential competition by 
eliminating Procter, the most likely prospect, as a potential new entrant 
to the market. 
The Supreme Court agreed, with the majority holding that the 
potentially anticompetitive effects of the acquisition could easily be seen, 
and that 
"the core question is whether a merger may substantially lessen competition, and 
necessarily requires a prediction of the merger's impact on competition, present and 
future ... There is every reason to assume that the smaller firms would become more 
cautious in competing due to their fear of retaliation by Procter. It is probable that 
Procter would become the price leader and that the oligopoly would become more 
145(1962) 370 US 294, 333, per Warren CJ, delivering the opinion of the majority; citing 
the Senate Report on the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission's 1948 report on 
merger policy, and Stigler, "Mergers and Preventative Antitrust Policy" (1955) 104 U Pa 
Law Rev 176, 180. 
146(1967) 386 us 568. 
· "d .. 147 ng1 . 
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Although concurring with the majority opm10n, Harlan J did not 
consider the effects of the acquisition to be as obviously anticompetitive 
as Douglas J. He saw the "key to a s 7 analysis" to be based purely on 
market structure changes, rather than actual evidence of market 
behaviour, and that the mere presence of a strengthened oligopolistic 
structure should be sufficient to disallow the acquisition, as this entailed 
the reasonable probability of substantially increased barriers to entry and 
of the enhancement of Procter's pricing power.148 
The emphasis on market concentration continued into the 1970s, with 
the Supreme Court generally taking the view that proof of a highly 
concentrated market, and an increase in concentration due to a merger, 
was prima facie evidence of a violation of the antitrust laws.1 49 In more 
recent years, however, this approach has softened somewhat, with the 
focus shifting to the "likelihood of coordinated interaction" among 
oligopolists. Structural factors (including levels of market concentration) 
which may facilitate or limit the potential for such conduct play an 
evidential role only.150 Nevertheless, the United States retains a 
"collective dominance" test with regard to its merger control 
provisions.151 
B Anti-Collusion Provisions 
The Commerce Act 1986 s 27 prohibits "contracts, arrangements or 
understandings" which have the purpose, effect or likely effect of 
147 At 580, per Douglas J. 
148At 595 and 604. 
149"Companies that have controlled sufficiently large shares of a concentrated market 
are barred from merger by s 7 [of the Clayton Act], not because of their past acts, but 
because their past performances imply an ability to continue to dominate with at least 
equal vigour": United States v General Dynamics Inc. (1974) 415 US 486, 501; "It is ... 
incumbent upon [the acquiring firm] to show that the market share statistics give an 
inaccurate account of the acquisition's probable anticompetitive effects": United States v 
Citizens & Southern National Bank Inc. (1975) 422 US 86, 120. 
150Rule and Meyer, "Towards a Merger Policy that Maximises Consumer Welfare: 
Enforcement by Careful Analysis, Not by the Numbers" (1990) 35 Antitrust Bulletin 251. 
See United States v Waste Management Inc. (1984) 743 F2d 976 and Cargill Inc. v 
Montfort of Colorado Inc. (1986) 479 US 104. 
151 Dupre, EEC Merger Control and the Oligopoly: Legal and Economic Analysis in the 
Light of the American Experience, Florence, European Universities Institute Monographs 
in Law No. 1 (1993), pl5, 49 and 146. Dupre concludes that "the US and EEC are coming 
closer in their antitrust analysis". 
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"substantially lessening competition in a market". Sec 30 specifically 
deems price fixing to fall within the s 27 prohibition.152 
The focus is thus on collusive action arising from an agreement. 
Borrowdale notes that 
"The emphasis on agreement is soundly based, as cooperation increases the risk of 
anticompetitive action, expands market power, creates an anticompetitive 
restraint not otherwise possible and surrenders important decision-making 
autonomy on a matter of competitive significance."153 
In a competitive industry, the structure of the market ensures that these 
outcomes will not result unless actual communication occurs between 
market participants, but this is not true in the case of an oligopoly. Firms 
in a highly concentrated market may "learn" that they can raise their 
prices significantly above competitive levels without fear of being 
undercut by their rivals, despite no communication ever having taken 
place. Nevertheless, the test generally employed to identify an actionable 
agreement under s 27 and its equivalents seems to assume competitive 
market conditions. Communication between the parties, or at least a 
conscious mutual commitment, is a necessary condition for liability to 
arise. 
The test is derived from the leading United Kingdom case, Re British 
Basic Slag Ltd,154 where Cross J said: 
"All that is required to constitute an arrangement not enforceable in law is that the 
parties to it shall have communicated with each other in some way, and that as a 
result of the communication each has intentionally aroused in the other an 
152At the time of writing, the Commerce Commission had just filed a statement of claim 
in the High Court accusing three of the four major oil companies with price fixing under s 
30 of the Commerce Act. It is unclear whether the alleged "arrangement or 
understanding" to fix petrol prices resulted from actual communication between the three 
parties, or merely from tacit collusion. This information is, according to the Commission, 
"evidence that will be used in court, and will not be released before it is presented to the 
judge": Facsimile message from Vince Cholewa, Commerce Commission Communications 
Officer, accompanying the Commission's media release, "Three Oil Companies Charged 
with Price Fixing", issued 4 September 1997. See also Weir, "Three Oil Firms Accused of 
Price Fixing", Dominion, Wellington, 4 September 1997, plS. 
153Butterworths Commercial Law in New Zealand (3rd ed.), Wellington, Butterworths 
(1996), p622. 
154(1962) LR 3 RP 178; affirmed by the Court of Appeal (1963) LR 4 RP 116. 
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expectation that he will act in a certain way."155 
In the Court of Appeal, Diplock LJ endorsed the need for 
communication of the terms of the arrangement between the parties: 
"It is sufficient to constitute an arrangement between A and B if (1) A makes a 
representation as to his future conduct with the expectation and intention that such 
conduct will operate as an inducement to B to act in a particular way, [and] (2) such 
representation is communicated to B, who has knowledge that A so expected or 
intended. "156 
The same standard has been held to apply in the United States and 
Australia,157 as well as New Zealand. In Auckland Regional Authority v 
Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland Airport) Ltd, Barker J said that 
"An arrangement or understanding comes into existence as a result of some 
communication between the parties; the communication can however occur by 
written or spoken word the one to the other, or by one observing and interpreting 
the other's behaviour."158 
155At 196 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the legislation under consideration 
in the British Basic Slag case, the Restrictive Trade Practices Act 1956 (UK), required 
that the agreement in question include the acceptance of "restrictions" by the parties to 
it. "Restriction" was defined by the Act to include "any negative obligation, whether 
express or implied, and whether absolute or not", and it was for this reason that Diplock 
LJ held that a mutual obligation to act in a certain way was required to constitute an 
agreement: (1963) LR 4 RP 116, 154. No such provision appears in the New Zealand, 
American or Australian Acts. 
156(1963) LR 4 RP 116, 155 (emphasis added). 
157In United States v Standard Oil Co. (1963) 316 F2d 884, 890 it was held that "unless 
the individuals involved understood from something that was said or done that they 
were, in fact, committed to raise prices, there was no violation of the Sherman Act"; 
while Australian cases like Top Performance Motors Pty. Ltd v Ira Berk (Qld) Pty. Ltd 
(1975) 1 ATPR 17,113, 17,116; and Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises Pty. 
Ltd (1979) 2 ATPR 18,333, 18,342 also refer to the need for communication and a mutual 
intention to follow a common course of action, citing the British Basic Slag case. While 
the Australian and American courts have at times accepted that collusion has taken 
place without evidence of explicit communication between the parties, they appear to 
have taken the view that such communication must have occurred, given the observed 
outcomes. The outcomes themselves do not seem to have been sufficient to establish 
collusion in the absence of any explicit communication: See, for example, Trade Practices 
Commission v Allied Mills Industries Pty. Ltd (1980) 3 ATPR 42,452, 42,458; Intersta te 
Circuit Inc. v United States (1939) 306 US 208, 226; and Milgram v Loew's Inc. (1951) 192 
F2d 579. 
158[1987] 2 NZLR 647, 662; citing the Australian Trade Practices Commission, Inquiry into 
Prices and Distribution of Motor Vehicle Spare Parts, Canberra, Submission to the New 
South Wales Prices Commission (1978). See also Commerce Commission v Wellington 
Branch New Zealand Institute of Driving Instructors (1990) 4 TCLR 19, 24. 
45 
Barker J's reference to communication by "observing and interpreting", 
although it suggests that s 27 could be an appropriate remedy for 
combating anticompetitive pricing by oligopolists, has never been 
applied by the New Zealand courts to such conduct. A distinction has 
been drawn in most cases between explicit acts of collusion on one hand 
and tacit undertakings on the other, despite the fact that the two 
categories are, in effect, indistinguishable.159 
The unsuitability of a test requiring explicit communication to 
concentrated industries, where such communication may be 
unnecessary and the only evidence of collusion may be parallel pricing 
behaviour where one would expect rivals to undercut, is evident from 
the cases which have considered the meaning of an arrangement or 
understanding in an oligopoly context. The few New Zealand and 
Australian cases on this issue have concluded that collusion is not an 
inevitable result of an oligopolistic market structure, and should not be 
inferred merely from parallel conduct which produces apparently 
anticompetitive outcomes. 
l New Zealand and Australian cases 
The New Zealand case of Re Magnum Corp. Ltd and Dominion 
Breweries Ltdl60 actually concerned an application by Magnum to the 
Commerce Commission for clearance or authorisation to merge with DB 
under the Commerce Act s 66. The issue before the Commission was 
whether or not this proposal would result in the merged company 
acquiring or strengthening a "dominant position in a market". In each of 
the markets under consideration,161 the Commission found that there 
were a few major participants (including the parties to these 
proceedings) holding up to a 40% market share each, and barriers to 
159Posner, above nl, at 1575. 
160(1986) 2 TCLR 177 (Commerce Commission Decision No. 182), affirmed by the High 
Court in Lion Corp. Ltd v Commerce Commission [1987] 2 NZLR 682. 
161 Both Magnum and DB were involved in the wholesale and retail liquor markets and 
in hotel accommodation. Magnum also had significant interests in wine making; DB in 
beer brewing. In addition, Brierley Investments Ltd was a major shareholder in both 
companies, and planned to increase its stake in Magnum. This was a cause for concern 
among other interested parties, notably Lion Corp. Ltd, DB's major competitor in the beer 
industry. 
46 
entry.162 
In equating "dominance" with "market power" (ie. the ability to behave 
"independently of the presence, actions and reactions of existing and 
potential competitors, purchasers and suppliers"),163 the Commission 
drew a distinction between such independence of behaviour, which it 
held to be inherent in the concept of dominance, and the notion of 
interdependent, parallel, conduct which characterises oligopolistic 
markets. The Commission saw the conditioning of a firm's behaviour by 
an awareness of its competitors' actions as evidence of competitive 
conditions, even in very concentrated markets. It held that high market 
concentration in itself did not inevitably lead to collusion. In the absence 
of demonstrable collusion with its principal competitor, Lion Corp. Ltd, 
the Commission was of the opinion that the merged entity would still be 
"disciplined" by Lion's presence and actions, and therefore would not be 
dominant in terms of the Act: 
"It is sometimes presumed that such concentration as exists in an oligopoly leads to 
cooperative behaviour or to interdependence in pricing and other strategic 
decisions that is equivalent to tacit collusion. While it is arguable that 
concentration or increased concentration itself might facilitate collusive 
behaviour, the Commission does not accept that collusion - explicit or implicit - let 
alone successful collusion, will necessarily follow."164 
This is, in itself, not incorrect; Posner notes that 
"voluntary actions by the sellers are necessary to translate the bare conditions of an 
oligopolistic market into a situation of non-competitive pricing ... Tacit collusion is 
voluntary behaviour."165 
However, the judgment of Lockhart J m Re Trade Practices Commission 
162The lack of access to retail outlets and customer brand loyalty were seen as 
"significant deterrents" to potential local and off-shore entrants to the beer brewing 
market. However, entry to the wine industry, the Commission believed, would be 
relatively easy for any firm with adequate financial and other resources: (1986) 2 TCLR 
177, 182-185. 
163(1986) 2 TCLR 177, 196. 
164At 196. 
165"0ligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach" (1969) 21 Stanford Law 
Rev 1562, 1575. 
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and Email Ltd166 extends this finding, by concluding that market 
concentration, even coupled with obviously parallel conduct, does not 
necessarily lead to an inference of collusion. The case was brought by the 
Commission against Email for conduct which allegedly breached s 
45(2)(b) of the Trade Practices Act 1974. The Commission claimed that 
Email and another company were parties to an "arrangement or 
understanding" with the purpose or likely effect of substantially 
lessening competition in the market for the manufacture and supply of 
kilowatt hour meters, used to measure electricity consumption. The two 
companies were the only suppliers of the meters in Australia at that 
time, with Email holding a market share of around 70%. 
Both companies issued identical price lists, submitted identical tenders, 
and sent to each other their respective price lists, as well as updated lists 
whenever they changed their prices or introduced any new product. The 
Commission based its claim of collusion on circumstantial evidence, 
there being no direct evidence of communication between the 
companies to the effect that their prices and tenders would be the same. 
Chief among this evidence was the fact that the companies' actions 
constituted "parallel conduct" from which, the Commission alleged, the 
inference could be drawn of the requisite arrangement or 
understanding. 
Lockhart J accepted that the parallel conduct of the parties could be 
explained by "commercial considerations" - flowing inevitably from the 
structure of the market - rather than by collusion. Referring to expert 
evidence on the nature of oligopolies, his Honour held that: 
"In this particular market there was a state of pure oligopoly where sellers ... are 
obliged to sell at one price, allowing for temporary or transient deviations. The 
result of pure oligopoly is that prices cannot diverge for more than short periods. 
The process by which this result is reached is either through price leadership of 
the dominant firm or barometric type, or collusion. The result does not justify an 
inference as to the process. Barometric price leadership occurs where one firm ... 
moves ahead in signifying its reading of the marketplace, and other firms are 
obliged to follow."167 
166(1980) 3 ATPR 42,367. 
167 At 42,373 (emphasis added). 
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Thus, it appears that outcomes which, m economic terms, can only be 
explained by collusion (which, in the wider economic sense, includes 
"price leadership") 168 would be held by the courts of Australia, and 
probably New Zealand, to be insufficient to satisfy the evidential 
requirements of an "arrangement or understanding" in terms of the 
Commerce and Trade Practices Acts. 
Allan suggests an alternative approach to the issue. He notes that, with 
regard to s 27 of the New Zealand Act, 
"the point has been reached that when [for example] customers act purely out of 
self interest with no reason to even suspect anti-competitive purpose on the part of 
their supplier, there can be breach of s 27. The search for some form of 
'arrangement or understanding' appears to have been made redundant and, through 
a process of elision, that part of s 27 which says 'enter into a contract or 
arrangement, or arrive at an understanding containing a provision' seems to have 
lost any purpose or effect. Instead, the courts have regarded the unilateral actions 
of one firm as equating to the elided words."169 
He goes on to suggest that s 27, as currently interpreted, may therefore be 
an appropriate tool for dealing with oligopolies: 
"In Port Nelson Ltd v Commerce Commission, 170 the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
[held] that where one party has the requisite purpose, ... whenever other parties, 
acting in their own self-interest, contract with the first party there will be a 
breach of s 27."171 
This approach focuses, not on tacit collusion between the oligopolists 
themselves, but on contracts between a firm and its customers . Allan 
168Miller and Round, "Price Fixing, Price Leadership or 'Ordinary Commercial 
Considerations': Guilt under Section 45 of the Trade Practices A ct" (1982) 10 ABLR 251, 
260 state that, in the Email case, "it is likely that the two firms did not require an 
explicit agreement or contract to reach a market result similar to that which colluding 
oligopolists would reach, namely the coordination of price through, in this case, price 
leadership. Expert economic testimony confirmed, for the court, that 'not only would the 
court not be justified in inferring that the parallel conduct was the result of collusion; but 
it was in fact the result of market forces based on commercial considerations'. This 
observation cannot be faulted, but the real reason for the operation of these 'market 
forces' would appear to have been that explicit collusion was unnecessary to reach a 
collusive result with regard to price" (emphasis in original). 
169 Above n75, p62. 
170(1996) 3 NZLR 554, 563-564. 
171Above n75, p2. 
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suggests that, if it can be shown that any firm in an oligopolistic market 
has an anticompetitive purpose, the "contract" requirement of s 27 is 
satisfied when that firm sells its products to a customer. Although 
removing the problem of establishing collusion without direct evidence, 
this approach faces the difficulty of showing that the contract in question 
has the purpose or likely effect of "substantially lessening competition in 
a market".172 It is difficult to imagine a situation where an individual 
transaction between an oligopolist and a customer could be said, in itself, 
to have substantially lessened competition. It is the agreement between 
the supplying firms which produces the effect on competition; the terms 
faced by the firms' customers are merely the results of this agreement. It 
is submitted, therefore, that the decision in Port Nelson Ltd does not 
extend the scope of s 27 to cover oligopolies. 
2 United States 
The tendency, also apparent to a limited extent in Australia, to rely on 
academics (particularly economists) to define the features and effects of 
oligopolies, also seems to apply to the American courts; indeed, an 
influential 1962 article on the subject by Donald Turner173 has been cited 
in over sixty United States antitrust cases, including six decided in the 
Supreme Court.174 However, as in New Zealand and Australia, and in 
contrast to the economic literature, the American collusion cases have 
generally focused on the process by which the parallel conduct in 
question has come about, rather than on its anticompetitive outcomes as 
such.175 
172"Substantial" has been defined to mean "real or of substance" and "not insubstantial or 
nominal" : Commerce Act 1986 s 2(1A); Re Fisher & Paykel Ltd [1990] 2 NZLR 731, 758-
759. 
1?3''The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and 
Refusals to Deal" (1962) 75 Harvard Law Rev 655. 
174Lopatka, "Solving the Oligopoly Problem: Turner's Try" (1996) 41 Antitrust Bulletin 
843, 844. These cases were White Motor Co. v United States (1963) 372 US 253, 268; 
United States v General Motors Corp. (1966) 384 US 127, 145; Albrect v Herald Co. (1968) 
390 US 145, 162; First National Bank of Arizona v Cities Service Co. (1968) 391 US 253, 
287; City of Columbia v Omni Outdoor Advertising Inc. (1991) 499 US 365, 396; and Brown 
v Pro Football Inc. (1996) 116 Set 2116, 2122, at the time of writing the most recent 
antitrust case to be heard by the Supreme Court. 
175Note, however, that the United States courts have taken a sterner view of parallel 
conduct than the Australian Federal Court did in Email, if the parallelism is facilitated 
by the explicit exchange of price information by competitors in a concentrated market. In 
United States v Container Corp. (1969) 393 US 333, 335, Douglas J said that such an 
exchange "is of course sufficient to establish the combination or conspiracy, the initial 
ingredient of a violation of s 1 of the Sherman Act ... This is obviously quite different 
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The equating of "conscious parallelism" among oligopolists with 
unlawful "conspiracy",176 an issue at the heart of what has been 
described as the "oligopoly problem",1 77 appears to have been first 
attempted in the United States in American Tobacco Co. v United 
States.1 78 In this case, the Government alleged that the three leading 
American cigarette manufacturers179 had conspired to fix the prices of 
their products. All three had charged identical prices for their cigarettes 
between 1928 and 1940. Any price rise initiated by one of the companies 
was almost immediately followed by the others. These parallel increases 
in price continued throughout the depression, although costs were 
declining, leading to substantial increases in profits for these companies, 
despite declining sales as some customers switched to cheaper brands. 
In the words of Turner; 
"Any economists worthy of the name would immediately brand this price 
behaviour as non-competitive. On can hardly find clearer evidence of an absence of 
effective competition than an increase in prices in the face of declining costs and 
weakening demand. "180 
from the parallel business behaviour condoned in Theatre Enterprises v Paramount Film 
Distributing Corp. (1954) 346 US 537" (see below). The editorial comment to the Email 
case notes that "an American court ... would have found a conspiracy ... on these facts": 
(1980) 3 ATPR 42,367, 42,368, citing Container Corp. 
l76Sherman Act 1890 s 1 
177Baker, "Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly 
Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory" (1993) 38 Antitrust Bulletin 143; Lopatka, 
"Solving the Oligopoly Problem: Turner's Try" (1996) 41 Antitrust Bulletin 843. 
178(1946) 328 US 781, discussed at length by Turner, "The Definition of Agreement under 
the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal" (1962) 75 Harvard Law 
Rev 655. 
179These three companies accounted for between 68% and 91 % of all cigarette sales in the 
United States throughout the 1930s. No other company had more than a 10% market 
share during this period. 
180"The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and 
Refusals to Deal" (1962) 75 Harvard Law Rev 655, 661. Nicholls, Price Policies in the 
Cigarette Industry: A Study of "Concerted Action" and its Social Control 1911-1950 
(1951), p89, cited by Posner, above nl, at 1586, concludes that "the fact that all saw fit to 
follow Reynolds' increase in 1931 suggests a strong element of cartel-like behaviour". 
Posner himself, however, describes the behaviour of the companies as "evidence ... of 
irrationality" if the case was simply one of raising prices in the face of declining costs 
and demand. Instead, he suggests that the companies' behaviour could have been 
indicative of successful product differentiation, leading to a higher price and higher 
advertising outlays - a pattern which could conceivably occur under competitive 
conditions. 
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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the District Court jury and 
the Court of Appeals that an unlawful conspiracy had occurred: 
"A friendly relationship within such a long established industry is, in itself, not 
only natural, but commendable and beneficial, as long as it does not breed illegal 
activities. Such a community of interest in any industry, however, provides a 
natural foundation for working policies and understandings favourable to the 
insiders and unfavourable to outsiders. The verdicts indicate that practices of an 
informal and flexible nature were adopted, and that the results were so uniformly 
beneficial to the petitioners in protecting their common interests as against those 
of competitors that, entirely from circumstantial evidence, the jury found that a 
combination or conspiracy existed among the petitioners."181 
The court concluded that 
"No formal agreement is necessary to constitute an unlawful conspiracy ... The 
essential combination or conspiracy ... may be found in a course of dealings or other 
circumstances, as well as in any exchange of words. Where the circumstances are 
such as to warrant a ... finding that the conspirators had a unity of purpose or a 
common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful 
arrangement, the conclusion that a conspiracy is established is justified."182 
After this early success, however, the later case of Theatre Enterprises 
Inc. v Paramount Film Distributing Corp. 183 is thought by some 
commentators to have "foreclosed" the idea that provisions which 
prohibit anticompetitive collusion are appropriate weapons against 
allegedly anticompetitive behaviour in oligopolies.184 The case 
concerned the refusal by a number of major motion picture producers 
and distributors to allow the screening of newly released films in all but 
a few selected theatres. Despite "a great deal of testimony by the 
defendants to the effect that the decision of each was an independent 
181(1946) 328 US 781, 794, per Burton J. As well as the identical prices charged by the 
three petitioners, this circumstantial evidence included the fact that the companies had 
refused to purchase tobacco from auction markets unless the others were also present 
(driving down the prices at such markets), and that each company had instructed its 
buyers to bid only up to identical "price ceilings" at the markets they did attend. 
182(1946) 328 us 781, 809-810. 
183(1954) 346 us 537. 
184stevens and Dean, "Horizontal Price Fixing and Competitor Collusion: In Search of 
Workable Boundaries", in Ahdar (ed.), above n96, p171; Pass and Sparkes, "Control of 
Tacit Collusion in Britain" (1981) 15 JWTL 521, 522-523. See Posner, above nl , at 1576-1578 
for an opposing view. 
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one, based purely on individual considerations",185 Theatre Enterprises 
Inc. claimed that this constituted a "combination or conspiracy in 
restraint of trade" in breach of s 1 of the Sherman Act. 
Clark J, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court, said: 
"The crucial question is whether the respondents' conduct toward the petitioner 
stemmed from independent decisions or from an agreement, tacit or express. To be 
sure, business behaviour is admissible circumstantial evidence from which the fact 
finder may infer agreement ... [But although] circumstantial evidence of consciously 
parallel behaviour may have made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial 
attitude toward conspiracy, ... 'conscious parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy 
out of the Sherman Act entirely."186 
It was thus held that proof of parallel business behaviour did not 
conclusively establish agreement, and that such behaviour without 
more did not constitute a breach of the Sherman Act. 
The latest consideration of tacit collusion in an oligopolistic market by 
the Supreme Court appears in Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp .,187 a case brought by one oligopolist against 
another. 
The cigarette market in the United States is highly concentrated, with six 
companies, including the two parties to these proceedings, dominating. 
Brooke had pioneered the economy segment of the cigarette market, 
developing a line of generic cigarettes, offered at a price roughly 30% 
lower than that of the branded product. Brown & Williamson began 
offering generic cigarettes at an even lower price, precipitating a price 
war which eventually resulted in Brown & Williamson selling its 
product at a loss. Brooke claimed that Brown & Williamson was guilty 
of anticompetitive price discrimination pursuant to the Clayton Act s 
2(a),188 in that its "predatory" prices were designed to eliminate 
185Turner, "The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism 
and Refusals to Deal" (1962) 75 Harvard Law Rev 655, 657. 
186(1954) 346 us 537, 540-541. 
187(1993) 509 us 209. 
188section 2(a) prohibits "discrimination in price between different purchasers of 
commodities of like grade and quality ... where the effect of such discrimination may be 
to substantially lessen competition or to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to 
injure, destroy or prevent competition". 
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competition, and restrain growth, in the economy segment of the 
market, allowing Brown & Williamson, and other companies, to earn 
excess profits on its branded cigarettes. It alleged that the scheme had 
been devised through a process of tacit collusion between Brown & 
Williamson and other cigarette companies. 
The court defined the requirements for liability under s 2(a), namely that 
the prices complained of must be below an appropriate measure of the 
firm's costs, and that the firm must have a reasonable prospect of 
recouping its investment in below-cost prices,189 and held that the 
second of these was not satisfied in this case. Kennedy J referred to the 
allegation of tacit collusion -
"the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated market might 
in effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit maximising, 
supracompetitive level by recognising their shared economic interests and their 
interdependence with respect to price and output decisions"190 -
and concluded that a predatory pncmg scheme reqmrmg concerted 
action was "generally implausible" and "incalculably difficult to execute" 
as, in order to succeed, the conspirators would have to agree on how to 
allocate the losses when prices were initially lowered (in the situation of 
a single firm charging predatory prices, these losses would fall on that 
firm only) and the future gains when these losses were recouped. These 
problems become even more apparent in cases where, as Brooke alleged, 
there has been no express coordination: 
"Firms that seek to recoup predatory losses through the conscious parallelism of 
oligopoly must rely on Lmcertain and ambiguous signals to achieve concerted action. 
The signals are subject to misinterpretation, and are a blunt and imprecise means of 
ensuring smooth cooperation, especially in the context of changing or unprecedented 
market circumstances. This anticompetitive minuet is most difficult to compose and 
to perform, even for a disciplined oligopoly ... On the whole, tacit collusion among 
oligopolists must be considered the least likely m eans of recouping predatory 
losses. In addition to the difficulty of achieving effective tacit coordination and 
189(1993) 509 US 209, 222-223; citing, inter alia, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v 
Zenith Radio Corp. (1986) 475 US 574, 585 and Cargill Inc. v Montfort of Colorado Tnc. 
(1986) 479 us 104, 117. 
190(1993) 509 us 209, 227. 
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the high likelihood that any attempt to discipline will produce an outbreak of 
competition, the predator's present losses in a case like this fall to it alone, while 
the later supracompetitive profits must be shared with every other oligopolist in 
proportion to its market share, including the intended victim."191 
Brooke's allegations were thus held to be "economically irrational", 
although it was conceded that a predatory pricing scheme designed to 
preserve or create a stable oligopoly could be subject to liability under the 
antitrust laws: "However unlikely that possibility may be as a general 
matter, when ... the facts indicate that it has occurred and was likely to 
have succeeded, theory will not stand in the way of liability". No 
indication was given, however, of what might need to be shown before 
the court would accept that such a scheme was in operation. 
Stevens J, dissenting, expressed doubts about whether effective tacit 
collusion was as difficult as the majority had concluded. Referring to the 
"anticompetitive minuet" described by Kennedy J, he said: 
"I would suppose ... that the professional performers who have danced the minuet 
for 40 to 50 years would be better able to predict whether their favourite partners 
would follow them in the future than would an outsider ... In any event, the jury 
was surely entitled to infer that at the time of the price war itself, Brown & 
Williamson reasonably believed that it could signal its intentions to its fellow 
oligopolists, assuring their cooperation."192 
Despite such statements, the test for collusion under the United States 
antitrust laws is still very much based on proof of communication 
between the parties. In the recent case of Brown v Pro Football Inc., 
Breyer J stated that antitrust liability could be premised upon "little more 
than uniform behaviour among competitors", but only if such conscious 
parallelism was "preceded by conversations implying that later 
uniformity might prove desirable ... or accompanied by other conduct 
that, in context, suggests that each competitor failed to make an 
independent decision".193 
3 European Community 
191At 228-229. 
l92At 258. 
193(1996) 116 SCt 2116, 2122. 
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In contrast, recent European cases have treated the communication of 
the parties' intentions merely as evidence of collusive behaviour, rather 
than as a necessary component of such conduct, as it appears to be in 
other jurisdictions. The position under article 85 of the European 
Community Treaty seems to be that, if it appears the conduct in question 
can only be explained by concerted action, and the European 
Commission alleges such, the parties will then have to provide an 
alternative rational explanation to avoid liability. 
Article 85(1) refers to three categories of behaviour, the first two of which 
- "agreements" and "decisions of associations" - are generally quite easy 
to establish. The concept of "concerted practices", however, is more 
vague, and is intended to cover cooperative activity between firms 
which falls short of an actual agreement. Goyder notes that: 
"Those who negotiated the terms of article 85 would have been well aware of the 
likelihood that in many sectors of European industry and commerce (particularly in 
those where there is a strong oligopolistic element) effective concertation of 
commercial policy could be arranged without the need for formal agreement, 
indeed often without the need for creation of any external evidence at all."194 
The term has been given a wide definition by the European courts. ICI 
Ltd v European Commission, 195 for example, concerned three uniform 
price increases by all the leading European producers of dyes and 
pigments in 1964, 1965 and 1967. Advocate General Maydras described 
the market as oligopolistic - being comprised of about 10 very large firms 
- and noted that, while this might sometimes naturally lead to parallel 
price decreases, it was less likely to account for concerted price increases, 
unless there was some form of agreement between the parties.196 He 
found the parties' parallel conduct "sufficiently suspicious" to conclude 
that it had resulted from collusion, particularly as there was evidence of 
contact between the firms. The court agreed that there had been 
concerted practices by the defendants, and held that although producers 
were free to take their competitors present and foreseeable conduct into 
account in making pricing decisions, it was a breach of article 85 to 
194EC Competition Law (2nd ed.), Oxford, Clarendon Press (1993), p97 (emphasis added). 
195The "dyestuffs" case [1972] CMLR 557. 
196see discussion of the "kinked demand" model above. 
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eliminate uncertainty as to the other parties' conduct through 
coordinated action. Uniformity in such matters as the amounts of the 
price increases, their dates and the exact range of products covered led 
the court to conclude that the firms had made advance announcements 
to each other and had so "substituted cooperation for the risks of 
competition".197 
It has been suggested by Goyder that the intentional communication of 
information between the parties, either directly or through an 
intermediary, is an important element in establishing a concerted 
practice,198 although it was found not to be essential in Re Woodpulp,199 
where a "suspicious lack of variation" in the quoted prices levels of 
several woodpulp producers was held by the Commission to have raised 
the presumption of a concerted practice. It was not suggested that there 
had been any communication between the firms, merely that their 
individual systems for quoting prices - each involving regular quarterly 
adjustments - contained sufficiently common features. The Commission 
accepted that the presumption could be displaced by evidence of a 
"genuine equilibrium" of prices in the market. 
C Anticompetitive Conduct in the Petrol Industry (II) 
Returning to the example of the New Zealand petrol industry; it appears, 
given the interpretations discussed above, that the New Zealand courts 
would not accept that the major petrol companies were guilty either of 
using a dominant position in a market, or of entering an arrangement or 
understanding, for anticompetitive purposes. 
Under s 36 of the Commerce Act, it would be necessary to show that a 
single firm held a "prevailing", commanding" or "governing" influence 
in the market.200 While it might be possible to show that each of the 
major petrol companies holds an "advantageous or powerful" position 
197[1972] CMLR 557, 622. The need for competition, "to maintain prices at the lowest 
possible level, and to encourage the movement of products ... so as to permit an optimum 
sharing out of activities on the basis or productivity and the adaptive capacity of 
undertakings", was held to outweigh the desire of the producers for price stability. 
198Ec Competition Law (2nd ed.), Oxford, Clarendon Press (1993), plOO. 
199[1985] 3 CMLR 474. See van Gerven and Varona, "The Woodpulp case and the Future of 
Concerted Practices" [1994] Common Market Law Rev 575. 
200cooke p in Teleco111 Corp. of New Zealand Ltd v Co111111erce Commission [1992] 3 NZLR 
429, 434; Gault Jin Port Nelson Ltd v Commerce Conm1ission [1996] 3 NZLR 554, 573. 
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in the industry, this has been held to be insufficient to establish 
dominance in terms of s 36.201 
While McGechan J's judgment in Port Nelson202 represents a less 
extreme view to that expressed in Telecom, it still appears to discount 
any possibility of an oligopoly being considered a "shared monopoly" 
possessing "joint dominance" in a market, a point noted with respect to 
the petrol companies by Scott, who also draws support for this 
conclusion from the Commerce Commission's latest Business 
Acquisition Guidelines. Dr Scott states that 
"the market shares of the four major oil companies range from 18% to 27.5% of the 
total market ... Only one firm in a market can possess a 'dominant position'. More 
importantly, the New Zealand Commerce Commission's recent Business 
Acquisition Guidelines contain what it refers to as 'safe harbour' provisions 
regarding dominance. In connection with mergers, it believes that 'a dominant 
position in a market is generally unlikely to be created or strengthened' when the 
merged entity has less that roughly a 40% market share, or when the merged 
entity has less than roughly a 60% market share and it 'faces competition from at 
least one other market participant having no less than in the order of a 15% 
market share'."203 
Under a test allowing for joint dominance, however, such as that used 
in the United States204 or the European Community, the behaviour of 
the leading petrol companies could well be caught. Such a test would 
require the court to assess whether the members of the oligopoly were in 
fact competing, or acting in concert to jointly exclude competitors, raise 
prices or maintain them at higher than competitive levels.205 
201 Richardson J in Teleco111 Corp. of New Zealand Ltd v Commerce Co111111issinn (1992) 3 
NZLR 429, 442. 
202(1995) 6 TCLR 406. 
203conditions of Entry into Petrol Importing, Wlzolesnling and Retailing in New 
Zealand, Report Commissioned by Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd, in association with Law 
and Economics Consulting Group Inc., (1997), p17; citing Conunerce Commission, Business 
Acquisition Guidelines 1996, Wellington, Commerce Commission (1996), p17. The lack of 
any recognition in the Guidelines of the potential for coordinated anticompetitive 
behaviour by oligopolists has, however, concerned some commentators: see Hay, The 
Draft New Zealand Merger Guidelines, Paper presented to the Seventh Annual 
Workshop of the Competition Law and Policy Institute of New Zealand Inc. (1996), p20-
21; and Berry, "The Commerce Commission's First Business Acquisitions Guidelines: A 
Comment" (1997) 3 NZBLQ 75, 79. 
204At least with respect to merger cases. 
20Ssee, for example, Re Nestle & Perrier (Unreported, Decision of the European 
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Under s 27 of the New Zealand Act, it appears that an actionable 
"arrangement or understanding" would only be established if it could be 
shown that there had been some sort of communication between the 
petrol companies. This is certainly the case in Australia and the United 
States,206 although the few New Zealand cases on this issue have not 
discounted the possibility that the communication required could be by 
way of one firm "observing and interpreting" another's behaviour.207 It 
remains to be seen whether the action recently brought by the 
Commerce Commission against three of the four major petrol 
companies for price fixing208 results in any clarification of the New 
Zealand position on anticompetitive arrangements and understandings. 
If an approach like that taken under article 85 of the European 
Community Treaty was adopted in New Zealand, the economic 
evidence produced by agencies like the IEA and NZIER might be 
sufficient to raise a presumption of collusion209 between the major 
players in the petrol industry. It would then be up to the companies 
themselves to displace that presumption by presenting evidence of an 
al terna ti ve explanation. 
V CONCLUSIONS 
The light-handed approach to competition policy adopted by the New 
Zealand legislature recognises that anticompetitive behaviour is not 
inevitable in highly concentrated markets, and that it is the misuse of 
market power, whether achieved through single-firm dominance or 
multi-firm collusion, which is the appropriate focus of competition law. 
It appears, however, that the interpretation generally given to New 
Zealand's market dominance and collusion provisions has failed to take 
Corrunission, 22 July 1992). 
206see, for example, Re Trade Practices Comllliss ion and Email Ltd (1980) 3 ATPR 42,367 
and Brown v Pro Football In c. (1996) 116 SCt 2116, 2122. 
207Barker J in Auckland Regional Authority v Mutual Rental Cars (Auckland Airport) 
Ltd [1987] 2 NZLR 647,662. 
208see Commerce Commission, "Three Oil Companies Charged with Price Fixing", 
Media Release, Issued 4 September 1997; and Weir, "Three Oil Firms Accused of Price 
Fixing", Dominion, Wellington, 4 September 1997, plS. 
209see, for example, Re Woodpulp [1985] 3 CMLR 474. 
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account of the unique features of oligopolies. There is evidence that 
some oligopolistic markets, such as that for the retail sale of petrol, are 
not competitive, and are thus operating at lower than optimal efficiency, 
resulting in significant transfers of wealth from consumers to producers 
as well as "dead weight" losses. This certainly conflicts with the purpose 
of the Commerce Act, as spelt out in the Long Title, and in cases like Tru 
Tone Ltd210 and Union Shipping NZ Ltd211 - to promote competition, 
and so to encourage market efficiency and enhance consumer welfare. 
It is submitted that, when the Commerce Act was enacted, the intention 
was that a Continental Can-type test should be applied to the concept of 
"dominance" in New Zealand cases. Indeed, the Department of Trade 
and Industry in its background paper on the Bill, referred extensively to 
the case and stated that although new to New Zealand, "the meaning 
and scope of the concept have been clarified by the case law of the 
European court" . Such an interpretation, while not assuring the 
application of s 36 to "jointly dominant" oligopolies, certainly allows for 
the possibility. The application of the similarly phrased European and 
United States merger control provisions to joint dominance is now 
firmly established, without condemning oligopolies per se, an approach 
in line with the light-handed New Zealand view of the significance of 
market structure. A definition of dominance which discounts the 
possibility of joint anticompetitive behaviour among oligopolists, such 
as that adopted in the Telecom decision,212 appears contrary to the 
purpose of the Act. The effects of misusing a dominant position, 
whether that dominance is solely or jointly held, are equally 
anticompetitive. 
Similarly, the approach to collusion favoured in the United States and 
Australia - to require evidence of communication between the allegedly 
colluding parties before liability will arise, economic evidence 
notwithstanding - also appears to be at odds with the objectives of 
competition law. The European approach relies much more on the 
anticompetitive outcomes of apparently collusive behaviour (rather 
than the means by which it is put into practice), recognising that it is 
these effects that competition law is aimed at curbing, although allowing 
210[1988] 2 NZLR 352, 358. 
211[1990] 2 NZLR 662, 699. 
212[1992] 3 NZLR 429,434 and 442. 
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for the possibility of alternative explanations. The objectives of the 
Commerce Act would, it is suggested, be better served if such an 
approach was adopted in New Zealand, particularly in cases involving 
oligopolistic industries. 
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